The Existing Indian Family Exception:
Denying Tribal Rights Protected by the
Indian Child Welfare Act*
Culturally, the chances ofIndian survival are significantly
reduced if our children, the only real means for the
transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in
non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of
their People. 1

!. INTRODUCTION
American Indian tribes have faced the threat of cultural extinction
since the first European explorer set foot on American soil. During
colonial times this threat was found in the colonists' attempts to
Christianize American Indians so they could be assimilated into the
European culture.2 When assimilation failed, the threat was the removal
of American Indians from their ancestral homelands and their subsequent
placement on reservations during the nineteenth century.3 By the end
of the nineteenth century, tribal culture was threatened by the individual

• The author would like to thank Professor Jean Montoya for her insight and
encouragement
I. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 95th Cong. 193 (1978) (statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians regarding the crisis tribes faced due to separation
of Indian children from their families and tribes).
2. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTI.E, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 6 (I 983).
3. Id. at 6-7. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 forced southern tribes to relocate
in the west. The impact of this removal was devastating. 16,000 thousand Cherokees
were marched west on the "Trail ofTears." The Choctaw nation was forced to surrender
ten million acres of ancestral homeland. Tribal members who remained on ancestral
homelands lost their tribal citizenship and were forced to assimilate into the European
culture. Id.
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allotment of reservation land.4 In the mid-twentieth century, a shortlived policy of tribal termination not only threatened, but almost
destroyed, tribal culture.5
The termination policy was effectively ended by the emergence of a
new policy of tribal self-determination.6 However, the threat to tribal
culture did not end. The threat this time was the wholesale removal of
American Indian children from their tribal culture. Studies conducted in
1969 and 1974 showed that twenty-five to thirty percent of American
Indian children were separated from their families and tribes by
placement in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions.7 Once
removed from their families, most of the children were placed in nonIndian environments. 8 In comparison to Caucasian children, the
disparity in removal statistics is staggering. In one state the risk that a
Indian child would be removed from her family was 1600 percent
greater than that of a Caucasian child.9 Removal statistics of other
states are similarly disproportionate.
Due to the mass removal of Indian children, tribal leaders faced a
precarious dilemma. Why were Indian children removed from their
families and communities in such overwhelming numbers? How could
the tribes prevent the wholesale removal of children from their homes?
Tribal leaders feared that if they lost their next generation of tribal
members, their cultural traditions would inevitably die. 10 How could

4. Id. at 9. The General Allotment Act of 1887 authorized the President to allot
reservations to individual tribal members. Id. Through the allotment policy, the federal
government had hoped to tum the American Indians into farmers. However, nearly half
of the allotted land was unsuitable for farming and much of the suitable farm land was
quickly leased or sold to Anglo-American settlers once Congress' amended the Act to
allow such action. Id. at 10. By 1928, assimilation through individual ownership was
considered a failure, and Congress attempted to reverse its effects by adopting the Indian
Reorganization Act in 1934. Id. at 12-14.
5. Id. at 20.
6. Id. at 22.
7. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7531. The compiled statistics were based on studies conducted in 16 states. In some
states the risk of removal was even higher. In Minnesota one out of every eight
American Indian children lived in adoptive placement Id.
8. Id. Approximately 85% of the American Indian children removed from their
families were placed in non-native homes.
9. Id. This overwhelming figure came from the state of Wisconsin. The removal
statistics of other states were just as overwhelming. In South Dakota, where Indians
made up 7% of the juvenile population, 40% of all adoptions were of Indian children.
In Washington state, the adoption rate in comparison to Caucasian children was 19 times
greater and the foster care placement rate was 10 times greater. Id.
10. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the United
States Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 154 (1977). At the
hearing, a Choctaw tribal chief testified that without the tribal children "education, the
tribe, Indian culture have little meaning or value for the future." Id.
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tribal culture continue to exist when the tribal children were being raised
in non-Indian environments? Worse yet, what would happen to these
children, raised in a culture which stereotyped Indians as uncivilized
creatures who needed to be assimilated into mainstream Euro-American
culture? 11
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 ("ICWA") attempted to answer
these questions and solve the tribes' and families' dilemma. 12 Why
were Indian children removed from their homes in such overwhelming
numbers? The ICWNs legislative history indicates that judges and
social workers were ignorant of the American Indian extended family
dynamic. 13 Congress designed the ICWA provisions to combat this
ignorance by providing minimum standards for the removal of Indian
children from their homes. 14 Congress also sought to place removal
decisions with those who had the greatest understanding of Indian
culture and the most to lose, the tribes. 15 To reach this end, the ICWA
grants the child's tribe either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in
Indian child custody matters. In cases where the state court retains
jurisdiction, provisions designed to protect the interests of parent, child,
and tribe must be followed. 16
Has the ICWA been successful in curtailing the removal of Indian
children and protecting tribal and family integrity? Not always. Since
the ICWA's inception state courts have struggled with its application and

11. For a thorough discussion of American Indian assimilation see Linda J. Lacey,
The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK.
L. REV. 327, 349 (1986).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1923 (1994). ICWA became fully effective and applied to
new and subsequent proceedings initiated 180 days after November 8, 1978. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1923 (1994).
13. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7532. The extended family often consisted of grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, or
the entire tribe. See Lacey, supra note 11, at 331-32. Social workers were unfamiliar
with this extended family dynamic, and they often equated leaving a child with an
extended family member as neglect Social workers also viewed with disfavor the
permissive child-rearing methods used by Indians. Interestingly, few Indian children
were removed from their families because of physical abuse. Most removals were based
on vague standards such as neglect or social deprivation. Alcoholism was another
frequently (and unequally) cited basis for removal. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7532.
14. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994) (congressional declaration of policy).
15. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), (b) (1994).
16. See discussion infra Part 11.B-D.

383

in difficult cases often refuse to apply it. 17 This Comment will address
one theory used to avoid application of the ICWA, the "existing Indian
family exception."18 The exception's basic premise is that the ICWA
only applies when an Indian child is removed from an existing Indian
family unit. To support this basic premise, courts applying the exception
conclude that Congress' prevailing purpose in enacting the ICWA was
to prevent the removal of Indian children from Indian families. 19
Therefore, they conclude, the purpose of the ICWA is not served when
it is applied outside the boundaries of an "existing Indian family." The
question then becomes: What is an "Indian family''?
Courts applying the existing Indian family exception focus on either
(1) the bond between the Indian parent and child, or (2) the parents' or
child's ties to the reservation or tribal culture. The exception was first
applied in cases involving unwed Indian fathers' attempts to intervene
in adoption proceedings where the biological mother was non-Indian.20
Courts have also applied the exception in cases where an Indian mother
attempts to revoke a voluntary relinquishment of custody.21 Finally, the
exception is increasingly applied in cases where the court detennines the
Indian parent is detached from tribal culture or the reservation.22

17. Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act
and the Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 353, 358 (1991),
I 8. States following the existing Indian family exception include Alabama,
Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, and Washington.
See S.A. v. E.J.P ., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re Appeal in Maricopa
County, 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz. Ct App. 1983); In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan.
1982); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996); Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331
(La. Ct App. 1995), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 478 (La. 1995), and cert. denied, I 16 S.
Ct 1549 (1996); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct App. 1986); In re Adoption of
Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Adoption of Infant Boy
Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992). States rejecting the exception include Alaska,
Idaho, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah. See OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit 10, § 40.1 (West Supp. 1997); In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska
1989); I11 re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993); In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32
(Mich. 1996); In re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. 1992); In re Adoption of
Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990); In re D.A.C., No. 950573-CA, 1997 LEXIS 17
(Ut App. Feb. 27, 1997). California appellate courts have split on application of the
exception. See In re Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 53 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1996)
(supporting the exception); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507
(1996) (supporting the exception), cert denied, Cindy R. v. James R., 117 S. Ct. 693
(1997); Adoption of Lindsay C., 229 Cal. App. 3d 404, 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1991); In
re Crystal K., 226 Cal. App. 3d 655, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1990); In re Junious M., 144
Cal. App. 3d 786, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1983).
19. See In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
20. See id.; In re Adoption of Baby Boy D.
21. See In re Adoption ofT.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
22. See S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re Adoption of
Infant Boy Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (1992). Petitioners have also unsuccessfully attempted
to apply the exception in intra-family disputes and surrogacy disputes. This Comment

384

Indian Family Exception

[VOL. 34: 381, 1997]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

This Comment analyzes the soundness of the existing Indian family
exception. Part II summarizes the basic provisions of the ICWA
focusing on the definitions, jurisdiction, intervention, and minimum
standards provisions. Part ill analyzes the basic premise of the existing
Indian family exception and its evolving application. Part IV critiques
the exception's basic premise and the application of the exception. Part
V concludes that the existing Indian family exception is a judicially
created exception to the ICWA which subverts the tribal and family
rights the ICWA was designed to protect.
II.

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

The Indian Child Welfare Act applies in child custody proceedings
involving Indian children. Tribal jurisdiction in these proceedings is
either exclusive or concurrent. When a state court retains jurisdiction in
a concurrent jurisdiction case, the ICWA provides minimum federal
standards to guide the state court proceedings.23
A.

The Jurisdictional Provisions

The most significant of the ICWA provisions are the jurisdictional
provisions. The ICWA provides that tribes will have either exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. A "child
custody proceeding" is defined as one involving foster care placement,
termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive
placement. Proceedings involving custody determinations in divorce
proceedings and juvenile delinquency proceedings are specifically
exempted from the definition.24 "Indian" is defined as any member of

will not address this failed application, but for a discussion of the issues see Toni H.
Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act 69 N.D.
L. REV. 465 (1993).
,
23. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK 363-64 (Nicholas J. Spaeth et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter CONFERENCE OF
WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL].

24. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1994). Section 1903(1) provides in full: ·
'[C]hild custody proceeding' shall mean and include-(i) "foster care placement" which shall mean any action removing an
Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement
in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator
where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned
upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated;
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an Indian tribe or an Alaskan native who is a member of a Regional
Corporation.25 An "Indian child" is one who is a member of an Indian
tribe or the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe and eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe. The child must be under eighteen
years of age and unmarried.26 The "Indian tribe" is any tribe, band,
nation, or organized group eligible for services provided to Indians by
the Secretary of the Interior.27
Whether a tribe will have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is based
on the location or domicile of the Indian child. When the Indian child
resides or is domiciled on the reservation, the ICWA grants exclusive
jurisdiction to the tribal court. Once an Indian child is adjudicated a
ward of the tribal court, jurisdiction remains with the tribe regardless of
where the child is subsequently domiciled or residing.28
Concurrent jurisdiction arises when the Indian child is domiciled off
the reservation. In this situation, a state court child custody proceeding
must be transferred to the tribal court upon petition by either parent, the
tribe, or an Indian custodian.29 However, the state court retains

(ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any action resulting
in the termination of the parent-child relationship;
(iii) "pre-adoptive placement'' which shall mean the temporary placement
of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the termination of
parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement; and
(iv) "adoptive placement'' which shall mean the permanent placement of
an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree
of adoption.
Such term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act
which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an
award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents.

Id.

25. 25 u.s.c. § 1903(3) (1994).
26. 25 u.s.c. § 1903(4) (1994).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1994). Section 1903(8) provides:
"Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group
or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to
Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any
Alaska Native village as defined in section 1602(c) of Title 43 ....
Id. Section 1903(11) defines "Secretazy'' as the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(11) (1994).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 19ll(a) (1994). Section 191 l(a) provides:
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled
within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise
vested in the state by existing federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward
of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.

Id.
29. The term "parent'' includes any biological parent or any adoptive parent. The
term does not include an unwed father unless paternity has been acknowledged or
established. U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1994). An "Indian custodian" is an Indian person who
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jurisdiction if: (1) it determines there is good cause to retain jurisdiction; (2) either parent objects to the transfer; or (3) the tribal court
declines jurisdiction.Jo
The appropriateness of the state courts' retaining jurisdiction based on
a finding of good cause is the subject of considerable debate.JI
Although the ICWA does not define "good cause," the Bureau of Indian
Affairs has promulgated advisory guidelines as to what constitutes "good
cause."32 Under the guidelines, good cause to retain jurisdiction of an
Indian child custody proceeding may exist where: (1) the proceeding is
in an advanced stage; (2) the Indian child is over twelve years of age;
(3) the presentation of evidence at the tribal court would create an undue
hardship to the parties or witnesses; or (4) the Indian child is over five
years of age, has had minimal or no contacts with the tribe, and the
child's parents are unavailable.33 These guidelines, however, are the
Bureau of Indian Affairs' interpretation of the ICWA and are not binding
upon any court.34 In addition to the Bureau of Indian Affairs'
enumerated guidelines, many state courts retain jurisdiction for "good
cause" when they determine that it is in the best interest of the child.JS
Therefore, a state court may readily retain jurisdiction over an Indian
child who does not reside on the reservation. However, the state court
must still follow the ICWA?s substantive and procedural provisions.

has custody of an Indian child. This custody may be legal custody granted by a tribal
or state court or mere care, custody, and control transferred by the child's parent. 25
u.s.c. § 1903(6) (1994).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 191l(b) (1994). Section 191l(b} provides:
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination
of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the
reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in·the absence of good cause
to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe,
absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the
Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall
be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
Id.
31. A thorough analysis of the debate over the "good cause" provisions of the
ICWA is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a full analysis of this issue see Jeanne
L. Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REv. 585 (1994).
32. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for State
Courts, Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67591 (1979).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Dale, supra note 17, at 353.
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B.

Tribal Intervention

In addition to providing exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction to tribes
in Indian child custody proceedings, the ICWA allows tribes liberal
intervention into state court proceedings. An Indian child's tribe or the
child's Indian custodian may intervene in a state court foster care
placement or termination of parental rights proceeding at any time.36
Additionally, state courts must give full faith and credit to tribal courts.
The full faith and credit extends to all public acts, records, and
proceedings of an Indian child custody proceeding.37

C.

Minimum Guidelines

In addition to the jurisdictional and intervention provisions, the ICWA
provides minimum guidelines for state courts to follow when they retain
jurisdiction of an Indian child custody matter. These standards establish
procedural and substantive safeguards for the protection of the child,
parents, and tribe. The core provisions provide procedure and establish
the burden of proof for pending state court proceedings; 38 provide
protection of parental rights in voluntary termination proceedings;39
offer preferences for the placement of Indian children;40 and allow
invalidation of state court action if certain ICWA provisions are
violated.41

I.

Procedural and Proof Requirements

Several procedural provisions protect the rights and interests of the
tribe, the child, and the parent. In child custody cases pending in state
courts where the court knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child, the ICWA requires a party seeking foster care placement
or termination of parental rights to notify the child's parent or Indian
custodian and the child's Indian tribe. This notification is only required
in involuntary foster care placement or parental rights termination
proceedings.42 Currently, no notice is required in voluntary foster care

36. 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(c) (1994).
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994).
38. 25 u.s.c. § 1912 (1994).
39. 25 u.s.c. § 1913 (1994).
40. 25 u.s.c. § 1915 (1994).
41. 25 u.s.c. § 1914 (1994).
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1994). Section 1912(a) provides in pertinent part:
In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has
reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster
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proceedings or voluntary adoption cases.43 The ICWA further protects
the parent or Indian custodian by mandating appointment of counsel.44
Additionally, active efforts must be made to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family through remedial services and rehabilitation programs.45
In addition to the procedural requirements, the ICWA prescribes the
burden of proof for foster care placement and parental rights termination
proceedings. In foster care placement proceedings, the court must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Indian child is likely to
suffer serious emotional or physical damage if the child remains in the
custody of the parent or Indian custodian.46 In order to terminate
parental rights, the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Indian child is likely to suffer serious emotional or physical damage if

care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall
notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered
mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their
right of intervention. . . .
Id.

43. Recently proposed legislation seeks to amend the ICWA by requiring notice
in voluntary adoption proceedings. See discussion infra Part II.D.
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1994). Section 1912(b) provides in full:
In any case in which the court determines indigency, the parent or Indian
custodian shall have the right to court-appointed counsel in any removal,
placement, or termination proceeding. The court may, in its discretion,
appoint counsel for the child upon a finding that such appointment is in the
best interest of the child. Where State law makes no provision for appointment of counsel in such proceedings, the court shall promptly notify the
Secretary upon appointment of counsel, and the Secretary, upon certification
of the presiding judge, shall pay reasonable fees and expenses out of funds
which may be appropriated pursuant to section 13 of this title.
Id.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1994). Section 1912(d) provides in full:
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that
active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these
efforts have proved unsuccessful.
Id.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1994). Section 1912(e) provides in full:
No foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence
of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child
by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child.
Id.
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the child remains in the custody of the parent or Indian custodian.47
Further, placement of the child or termination of parental rights must be
supported by qualified expert testimony.48
2.

Voluntary Placement or Termination

The ICWA provides several safeguards to ensure the protection of
parental rights where the parent or Indian custodian voluntarily place a
child in foster care or terminates parental rights. Consent to the
placement or termination must be in writing and recorded with the court.
The court must certify that the parent or Indian custodian understood the
termination or placement. Additionally, voluntary consent given less
than ten days after the birth of the child is invalid.49
The ICWA also protects the parent or Indian custodian by allowing
liberal withdrawal of consent. In the case of foster care placement,
consent may be withdrawn at any time, and the child will be returned to
the parent or Indian custodian.so Where voluntary termination of
parental rights or adoption is at issue, the parent may withdraw consent
at any time before the entry of the final order, and the child ,viii be
returned to the parent.s 1 Additionally, a court will vacate a final
adoption decree if consent to the adoption was ·gained by fraud or
duress.s2

47. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1994). Section 1912(e) provides in full:
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody
of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.

Id.
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e), (t) (1994).
49. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1994).
50. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) (1994). Section 1913(b) provides in full: "Any parent
or Indian custodian may withdraw consent to a foster care placement under State law at
any time and, upon such withdrawal, the child shall be returned to the parent or Indian
custodian." Id.
51. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1994). Section 1913(c) provides in full:
In any voluntarY proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or adoptive
placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for
any reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or
adoption, as the case may be, and the child shall be returned to the parent.

Id.
52.
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3.

Placement Preferences

Tribal concerns regarding the placement of Indian children are
safeguarded by placement preference provisions. In adoptive placement
proceedings, preference is given first to the extended family, then to
other tribal members, and finally to other Indian families. 53 Similarly,
preference standards apply in foster care placement proceedings. First
is placement with the extended family, second is placement in a tribally
specified foster care home, third is placement in a non-Indian authorized
Indian foster home, and finally placement in a tribally approved
institution.54 The ICWA mandates that the social and cultural standards
of the tribe should influence these adoptive and foster care placement
preferences.55

4.

Invalidation

The final and possibly most stringent safeguard allows a parent, an
Indian custodian, or the child's tribe to petition the state court to
invalidate foster care placement or termination actions when certain
provisions of the ICWA have been violated.56 The petitioning party
must show a violation ofjurisdictional provisions, procedural provisions,
burden of proof provisions, or voluntary placement provisions.57

D.

Proposed Amendments

The ICWA has remained unchanged since its inception in 1978.
There have, however, been several bills introduced in Congress which
proposed substantial amendments to the act. Currently, legislation that
would both benefit and burden tribes is pending in the House of

53. 25 U.S.C. § !915(a) (1994).
54. 25 u.s.c. § 1915(b) (1994).
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994). Section 1915(d) provides in full:
The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of this
section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian
community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the
parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties.
Id.

56.
57.

25
Id.

u.s.c. § 1914 (1994).
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Representatives.58 This current bill is substantially similar to legislation
that passed the Senate, but was stalled by the House of Representatives
during the final days of the 104th Congress. 59 The pending bill is
considered a compromise to proposed legislation that would have
codified the existing Indian family exception.60
·
The 104th Congress is not the first to consider the existing Indian
fanµly exception. Ironically, Senate Bill 1976, which would have
overruled the existing Indian family exception, was introduced in the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs during the 100th Congress.61
Most notably, Senate Bill 1976 sought to amend the ICWA's definition
of "Indian child" and "child custody proceeding" to guarantee that it
applied to Indian children who did not live on the tribe's reservation,
"regardless of whether that child was a member of an existing Indian
family." 62 One catalyst behind Senate Bill 1976 was the delay often
accompanying cases involving the ICWA. 63 The bill sought to limit
delays by clarifying the ambiguities in the act and strengthening tribal
rights under the act.64
Several years passed before new amendments to the ICWA were
proposed. On May 6, 1995, Representative Pryce of Ohio introduced
House Bill 1448 which would have limited the ICWA by assuring that
58.

H.R. 1082, 105th Cong. (1997).

59.

See S. 1962, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3828, 104th Cong. (1996).
See H.R. 3286, 104th Cong. (1996).

60.
61. S. 1976, 100th Cong. (1987).
62. S. 1976 §§ 4(1), (5)(c). Section 4(1) provides: "'child custody proceeding'
shall mean and include any proceeding referred to in this subsection involving an Indian
child regardless of whether the child bas previously lived in Indian Country, in an Indian
cultural environment or with an Indian parent ...•" S. 1976 § 4(1). Section (5)(c)
includes as an "Indian child" a child who "is of Indian descent and is considered by an
Indian tribe to be part of its community ••••" S. 1976 § 4(5)(c). Additionally, the bill,
among other things, added definitions for domicile, qualified expert witness, and
residence; limited the state courts' ability to deny transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court
for good cause; extended tribal notice provisions to adoptive and pre-adoptive placement;
strengthened the states' evidentiary burden; further protected the Indian child's right to
maintain ties to tribal culture; required tribal notice for voluntary placement proceedings;
established an Indian child welfare committee; and extended the ICWA's coverage to
Canadian aboriginal people. S. 1976 §§ 4(2), 4(11), 4(13), IOl(b), 102(a), 102(g),
102(h), 103(2), I 14, 116.
63. 133 CONG. REC. 36601 (1987) (statement of Sen. Evans). In speaking of the
Indian child in Adoption ofHalloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) Senator Evans stated:
It is extremely unfortunate that this young Indian boy and his family were
subjected to such a long and trying court battle. This unreasonable delay
stems from conflicting views over interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare
Act. Lack of clarity in the act resulted in many court disputes over jurisdiction and agency responsibility. Furthennore, ambiguities inherent in the
language of the act have helped to sustain these problems.

Id.

,

64.

392

133 CONG. REC. 36607-08 (1987).

[VOL. 34: 381, 1997]

Indian Family Exception
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

tribal membership decisions were prospective and could not be used to
retroactively invoke the ICWA.65 Under House Bill 1448, the ICWA
would only apply if the Indian child or Indian parent was a tribal
member at the initiation of child custody proceedings.66 The bill
defined tribal membership as enrollment or recognition as a member
"under consistently applied policies and practices ...." 67 House Bill
1448 was referred to the Subcommittee on Native American and Insular
Affairs, and the Subcommittee held hearings on the bill on May 10,
1995.68 Testimony from the hearings revealed that Indian adoptions
under the ICWA were often prolonged and caused instability in the
Indian child's placement.69 Adoption advocates testified that House
Bill 1448 would limit the instability and prolonged litigation.70 Tribal
representatives testified that prolonged litigation could be avoided if the

65. H.R. 1448, 104th Cong. (1995). See also S. 764, 104th Cong. (1995) (a
virtually identical bill introduced in the Senate on May 8, 1995, by Senator Glen).
66. H.R. 1448, 104th Cong. (1995). The bill provided: "For the purposes of any
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child, membership in an Indian tribe shall
be effective from the actual date of admission to membership in the Indian tribe and
shall not be given retroactive effect" H.R. 1448 § 2(e). The bill was prompted in part
by a California custody battle that was finally settled by the California Court of Appeal
in In re Bridget R, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (1996); 141 Cong. Rec.
H6023-02 (1995) (statement of Rep. Pryce). Speaking of the trial court's ruling in
Bridget R., Representative Pryce stated:
Yesterday, a judge in California took [adoptive children] away from the only
family they have ever known and awarded custody to a perfect stranger, the
birth grandmother.
The only reason for this is that the girls are 1/32 Pomo Indian and the judge
ruled that the Indian Child Welfare Act applies to these children and that tribal
rights supersede all other interest
Mr. Speaker, I have introduced legislation to amend the ICWA to prevent
these injustices in the future.
141 CONG. REC. H6023 (daily ed. June 15, 1995). The trial court's ruling in Bridget R.
was overturned on appeal when the appellate court applied the existing Indian family
exception to avoid the ICWA. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text
67. H.R. 1448 § l(b)(13). Toe bill provides: "'Member ofan Indian tribe' means
a person who is on the membership roll (or otherwise considered a member under
consistently applied policies and practices) of the Indian tribe •..." Id.
68. H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 11 (1996).
69. Id. The report provides: "The hearings ... demonstrated that avoidable and
prolonged litigation over the application of ICWA needlessly destabilizes some Native
American adoptions. This litigious environment discourages adoptive parents from
adopting Native American children, and disrupts some adoptive placements to the
detriment of the child." Id.
70. Id. at 2-3.
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ICWA's tribal notice provisions included voluntary adoption proceedings.71 Based on the sharply divided testimony, the Committee
instructed tribal representatives and adoption advocates to work together
in reaching a solution to the problems raised at the hearings. 72
Before a compromise could be reached, new ICWA amendments were
introduced in the House of Representatives.73 These amendments,
which were eventually incorporated as part of the Adoption Promotion
and Stability Act of 1996, resurrected House Bill 1448 and also sought
to codify the existing Indian family exception.74 The bill limited child
custody proceedings, in cases where the family did not live on the
reservation, to families who maintained "significant social, cultural, or
political affiliation with the Indian tribe of which either parent is a
member."75 After narrowly passing the House, the ICWA amendments
were struck by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.76 Significantly, neither tribal representatives nor the House Committee with
jurisdiction over Indian affairs was consulted in drafting the amendments. 77
Compromise finally came when Senator McCain introduced Senate
Bill 1962 on July 16, 1996.78 Senate Bill 1962 was the result of
negotiations between tribal representatives and adoption advocates.79
The National Congress of American Indians, at its 1996 mid-year
convention, developed compromise amendments that served as the basis
for Senate Bill 1962.80 These amendments, in turn, where supported

71. Id. at 2. The report also provided that delay is often caused in cases requiring
notice to the tribes because the notice is either late or never comes at all. Studies in
Alaska revealed that "social workers notified tribes in only 47.3 percent of cases
reviewed, [and provided notice] ... in only 77.8 percent of cases prior to termination
of parental rights." Id.
72. Id. at 3.
73. H.R. 3286, 104th Cong. (1996).
74. H.R. 3286 §§ 301, 302. The amendments to codify the existing Indian family
exception were originally proposed by H.R. 3275, 104th Cong. (1996). The House
Committee on Resources rejected the amendments, but they were reincorporated while
the bill was in the Rules Committee. H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 14 (1996).
75. H.R. 3286 § 301.
76. H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 3, 14 (1996).
77. Id. at 14.
78. 142 CONG. REC. S7900 (daily ed. July 16, 1996).
79. 104 S. REP. No. 104-335, at 11-12 (1996). Senate Bill 1962, 104th Cong.§ 6
{1996) was the product of the year-long efforts of several representatives of the adoption
community and of Indian tribal governments who jointly developed compromise
amendments to the ICWA. Id. The Senate Report indicates that the National Congress
of American Indians, the National Indian Child Welfare Association, the American
Academy of Adoption Attorneys, and the Academy of California Adoption Attorneys
were actively involved in developing the compromise legislation. Id. at 12.
80. Id.
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by adoption advocates.81 Identical legislation was introduced in the
House on July 16, 1996.82 The compromise amendments contained in
the Senate and House bills provided notice to tribes in voluntary child
custody proceedings;83 limited when a tribe could intervene in voluntary proceedings; 84 created criminal sanctions for attorneys who
concealed a child's Indian heritage;85 and limited the biological parents'

81. Id. at 24 ("Representatives of both the Indian tribes and the adoption
community have confirmed that S. 1962 is within the parameters of, and is consistent
with, the 'Tulsa' compromise agreement.") See also Statement of Deborah J. Doxtator,
May 26, I 996, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Transcript of Congressional
Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 26, 1996, available in
CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829257 (Wisconsin Oneida Tribal Chairwomen
generally supporting Senate Bill 1962); Statement of Mary Thomas, May 26, 1996,
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Transcript of Congressional Testimony, Federal
Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 26, 1996, available in CONGTMY database, 1996
WL I 0829256 (Gila River Indian Community Governor generally supporting Senate Bill
1962); Statement ofW. Ron Allen, May 26, 1996, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
Transcript of Congressional Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing House, Inc., May
26, 1996, available in CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829255 (National Congress of
American Indian President generally supporting Senate Bill 1962); Statement of Michael
J. Walleri, May 26, 1996, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Transcript of
Congressional Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 26, 1996,
available in CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829723 (Tanana Chiefs Conference
general counsel generally supporting Senate Bill 1962); Statement of Marc Gradstein,
May 26, 1996, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Transcript of Congressional
Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 26, 1996, available in
CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829207 (adoption attorney generally supporting
Senate Bill 1962); Statement of Jane A. Gorman, May 26, 1996, Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs, Transcript of Congressional Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing
House, Inc., May 26, 1996, available in CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829208
( adoption attorney on behalf of American Academy of Adoption Attorneys and the
Academy of California Adoption Lawyers generally supporting Senate Bill 1962).
82. H.R. 3828, 104th Cong. (1996).
83. S. 1962, 104th Cong. § 6 (1996). The amendment provided: "A party that
seeks the voluntary placement of an Indian child or the voluntary termination of the
parental rights of a parent of an Indian child shall provide written notice of the
placement or proceeding to the Indian child's tribe." Id. Under the bill, tribal notice
would be required within I 00 days of foster care placement, within five days of
preadoptive or adoptive placement, and within 10 days of commencement ofan adoption
proceeding. Id.
84. S. I 962 § 8. This section limited the time in which a tribe could intervene
in a voluntary proceeding. In cases terminating parental rights, the tribe received 30
days from receipt of notice to intervene or object. In voluntary adoption cases, the tribe
received 90 days from receipt of notice of an adoptive placement and 30 days from
receipt of notice of adoption proceedings. Id.
85. S. 1962 § 9. This section required criminal sanctions be imposed on anyone,
other than a birth parent, who "knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up
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withdrawal of adoption consent.86 The amendments did not address the
existing Indian family exception.
Senate Bill 1962 passed the Senate on September 26, 1996.87
However, the House bill was stalled in the final days of the 104th
Congress by the National Right to Life Committee's lobbying efforts. 88
The committee feared the bill would encourage abortions among Indian
families because women would lose control over their pregnancies.89
Substantially similar legislation was introduced in the 105th Congress on
March 18, 1997, and is currently pending in the House of Representatives.90 Again, the newly proposed amendments do not address the
existing Indian family exception-an ironic twist considering the
exception sparked the ongoing legislative debate.

by trick, scheme, or device, a material fact concerning whether •.. a child is an Indian
child ... or a parent is an Indian ...." Id. The sanctions were included in the
amendments in the hope that fear of criminal liability would prevent adoption attorneys
and advocates from concealing a child's Indian heritage. Earlier testimony indicated
that birth parents were often encouraged to hide their Indian heritage to avoid application
of the ICWA. S. REP. No. 104-335, at20-21 (1996).
86. S. 1962 § 5. Revocation of voluntary adoptive consent is limited under this
section to 180 days from the date the tribe receives notice. If the birth parent does not
receive notice of the adoption proceedings 30 days before the conclusion of the 180 day
period, the revocation period is extended 30 days from the date of actual notice to the
parent Id.
87. 142 CONG. REC. DI007 (daily ed. Sept 26, 1996).
88. Failed Indian Adoption Law Spurs Hard Feelings, Az. DAILY STAR. Dec. 12,
1996, available in 1996 WL 15090686.
89. Id. See also Roger K. Lowe, Indian Adoption Bill Dies in House Pryce Says
She'll Push for More Reform, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct I, 1996, available in 1996 WL
11023740 (indicating that Rep. Pryce will push new legislation in the 105th Congress).
Abortion opponents apparently assumed that some Indian 'mothers would rather abort
their babies than see them raised within their tribal culture.
90. H.R. 1082, 105th Cong. (1997). House Bill 1082 was introduced by
Representatives Young and Miller. In his remarks accompanying the bill, Representative
Miller indicated that the parties did not wholeheartedly support the compromise
agreement.
This bill is intended to strengthen the [ICWA], to protect the lives and future
of Indian children first and foremost .... We understand that to a few parties
on either side of the debate this bill may not seem perfect Few compromises
are. But what this bill does is truly important This bill helps Indian children
by providing allowing [sic] adoption to move forward quickly and with greater
certainty. This bill places limitation on when Indian tribes and families may
intervene in the adoption process. Yet at the same time, this bill protects the
fundamental rights of tribal sovereignty.
143 CONG. REc. E462 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Miller).
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ill.

THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION

A.

Basic Premise

As previously noted, the ICWA is applicable in child custody
proceedings involving Indian children. Thus, there are only two
requirements for invocation of the ICWA. First, the proceeding must be
a child custody proceeding as defined by the ICWA. Second, the child
must be an Indian child as defined by the ICWA. 91 Contrary to the
plain language of the ICWA, some courts have created a third requirement for invocation of the ICWA, an existing Indian family. These
courts reason that the ICWA should only apply when an Indian child is
being removed from an Indian home. Congress' purpose in enacting the
ICWA, they conclude, was to maintain existing Indian families and to
provide minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children
from Indian homes.
The basic premise of the existing Indian family exception originated
in adoption proceedings involving illegitimate children of non-Indian
mothers and putative Indian fathers. In the earliest of the notable cases,
In Re Adoption of Baby Boy L,92 the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a
trial court's refusal to apply the ICWA in the adoption of an enrolled
member of the Kiowa tribe.93
Baby Boy L. was the illegitimate son of Miss L., a non-Indian, and
Carmon Perciado, a five-eighths-blood quantum Kiowa tribal member.
Upon the birth of the child, Miss L. consented to Baby Boy L.'s
adoption. Perciado, who received notice of the adoption proceedings
while incarcerated, objected to the adoptive parents' attempts to
terminate his parental rights and sought permanent custody of his son.94
During the trial to terminate Perciado's parental rights, the court learned
of Perciado's ethnicity and continued the trial to allow proper notice to
the Kiowa tribe. Following notice, the Kiowa tribe petitioned to

91. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 23, at 364-67.
92. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
93. The refusal to apply the !CWA was based, in part, on the fact that the child
was not being removed from an existing Indian family. Id. at 176.
94. Id. at 172-73. Neither Miss L. nor the adoptive parents disputed that Perciado
was the natural father of Baby Boy L.

397

intervene in the proceedings, change temporary custody,95 and transfer
jurisdiction to the tribal court.96 The trial court found that the ICWA
did not apply to the proceedings and denied the Kiowa tribe's petitions.97
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings and held
that "the ICWA, by its own terms, does not apply to [the] proceedings
98
••• •"
The court reasoned that to apply the ICWA to the factual
situation would violate Congress' policy and intent in adopting the
ICWA.99 Congress' overriding concern in enacting the ICWA, the
court opined, was to maintain existing Indian family homes and tribal
relationships and provide minimum standards for the removal of Indian
children from these existing homes. 100 Thus, the existing Indian
family exception was bom.

B. Application
In analyzing the existing Indian family exception, the first question
must be what constitutes an Indian family. The courts applying the
exception have considered two factors to determine whether a child is a
member of an existing Indian family. The first factor focuses on the
family aspect of the exception. Here, to constitute an Indian family, the
Indian child must have developed a bond with an Indian parent. The
second factor focuses on the "Indian-ness" of the family. To constitute
an Indian family under this factor, the Indian parent or child must have
significant ties to tribal culture or the reservation. 101

95. The court previously granted temporary custody to the adoptive parents. Id,
at 172.
96. Additionally, the Kiowa tribe enrolled Baby Boy L. as a tribal member on the
basis of the child's 5/16 blood quantum. Miss L. opposed the enrollment. Id. at 173.
91. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 173.
98. Id. at 176.
99. Id. at 175. In reaching this opinion, the court relied on and extensively quoted
a critique of the ICWA by Professor Russell Lawrence Barsh. The court emphasized
that "[t]he Act principally applies to cases where a state court attempts to remove an
Indian child from his or her home on grounds of the alleged incompetence or brutality
of the parents." In re Adoption of Baby Boy L. 643 P.2d at 176 (quoting Russell L.
Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
1287, 1305 (1980)).
100. Id. at 175. "A careful study of the legislative history behind the Act and the
Act itself discloses that the overriding concern of Congress and the proponents of the
Act was the maintenance of the family and tribal relationships existing in Indian homes
and to set minimum standards for the removal of Indian children from their existing
Indian environment" Id.
101. For a similar analysis see In re Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 149092, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 685-86 (1996).
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I.

Existing Bond With Indian Parent

Cases refusing to apply the ICWA under the first factor (because the
child does not have a sufficient bond with an Indian parent) can be
divided into two broad categories. The first, and by far the largest,
category involves attempts by Indian fathers (or the father's tribe) to
invoke the ICWA. These cases generally involve a non-Indian unwed
mother's attempt to place her Indian child for adoption with a nonIndian family against the wishes of the child's Indian father or tribe. By
invoking the exception here, state courts ignore the ICWA and apply
state law. This allows the state court to deny the Indian father or tribe
the right to intervene and also allows the state court to avoid a
placement preference with an Indian family. The second category
involves attempts by Indian mothers (or the mother's tribe) to invoke the
ICWA. Here, state courts generally apply state law to thwart an Indian
mother's attempt to revoke a voluntary adoption or foster care placement. Additionally, by refusing to apply the ICWA state courts again
may ignore placement preferences.

a.

Indian Fathers

As noted, the category involving Indian fathers is by far the largest
and oldest of the two categories. In fact, the case that developed the
existing Indian family exception, In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.,
involved a non-custodial Indian father. The early courts applying the
exception primarily stayed within this category. The first court to
consider the newly developed exception was the Arizona Supreme Court.
In In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 102 the supreme court denied
application of ICWA because the Indian father had not acknowledged
paternity of the Indian child. 103 The court reasoned that until a
putative Indian father acknowledges paternity, the child is not an Indian

102. 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz. 1983). In this case the unwed non-Indian mother (R.M.)
met with Catholic Social Services (C.S.S.) prior to the birth of the child to arrange for
adoption. R.M. told C.S.S. she did not know who the father was, but suspected it might
be a Pima Indian, Edmund Jackson. Following the birth of the child (who had Indian
features), C.S.S. located Jackson and informed him of the child. Jackson visited the
child, but at the time made no attempt to acknowledge paternity. Id. at 230.
I 03. Id. at 232.
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child under the ICWA. 104 This rationale was based on the ICWA's
definition of "parent," which does not include an unwed father who has
not acknowledged or established paternity. 105 The court concluded that
its construction of what constitutes an Indian child was in accord with
the ICWA's congressional intent, namely to prevent the destruction of
Indian families. 106 Although the Arizona court used the same rationale
as the Kansas court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., it distinguished
its decision. In Baby Boy L. the Kansas Supreme Court had refused to
apply the ICWA even though the father acknowledged patemity. 107
The distinguishing factor, according to the Arizona court, was the
acknowledgment of the child. Thus, Arizona has limited its application
of the existing Indian family exception.
Even though the Arizona court did not fully embrace the exception,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on the holding and rationale from
In re Appeal in Maricopa County to support the existing Indian family
exception. In In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 108 the court concluded
that the ICWA did not apply when the child in question had never

104. Jackson acknowledged paternity of the child three years after she was born and
3 I months after initiation of the adoption proceedings. Id. The definition of Indian
child under ICWA reads as follows: "'Indian child' means any unmarried person who
is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe." 25 U.S.C. 1903(4) (!994).
I05. For a discussion of putative fathers' rights under the ICWA see Toni H. Davis,
The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act 69 N.D. L. REV.
465 (1993).
106. In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d at 233. The court specifically
stated:
We think Congress has, by this language, evidenced its intent not to extend the
ICWA to a child whose mother is non-Indian and whose father has failed to
come forward and lay legal claim to the child. This construction of the ICWA
is in accord with the stated purpose of the Act-to protect Indian children
from the destruction of Indian family units by child welfare agencies and
COurtS.

Id. But cf. In re Appeal in Coconino County, 736 P.2d 829 (Ariz. 1987) ("The fact that

a child may have been living in a non-Indian home is no reason, standing alone, to
dispense with the provisions of the Act").
107. Id. at 233 n.5.
JOS. 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985). Baby Boy D. was the illegitimate child ofa nonIndian mother and a Seminole Indian father. During the mother's pregnancy, the father
exhibited no interest in the child and did not object to the mother's intention to place the
child for adoption. However, the father apparently had a change of heart when he
learned of the child's adoption and filed a petition to vacate the adoption less than two
months after the child's birth. Id. at 1059-61. A strong dissent by Judge Kauger
suggests the father's interest in the child was triggered when his mother learned of the
child's birth and assumed the child was equally her responsibility as a traditional
extended Indian family care-giver. Id. at 1077.
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resided in an Indian family and had a non-Indian mother. 109 The
purpose of the ICWA, the court reasoned, was to provide minimum
federal standards for the removal of Indian children from existing Indian
families.
In In re Adoption of D.MJ.,110 the Oklahoma Supreme Court again
applied the existing Indian family exception. This time the court used
the exception to deny a divorced non-custodial Indian father the ability
to invoke the ICWA. D.M.J. was a ten-year old half-Indian child of
divorced parents. D.M.J.'s mother placed her- for adoption with a nonIndian couple. D.M.J.'s full-blood Cherokee father objected and the
tribe moved to intervene. The trial court determined that due to the
father's failure to support D.M.J., adoption could proceed without his
consent. 111
In applying the existing Indian family exception, the court reasoned
that because the father had not had custody in the six years preceding
the adoption, the child was not part of an existing Indian family. 112
The court also theorized that because the ICWA was designed to prevent
culture-shock to an Indian child who is placed in a non-Indian environment, the same concern should prevent the placement of D.M.J. in an
Indian environment. 113

109. Id. at 1064. The court specifically stated: "Here we have a child who has
never resided in an Indian family, and who has a non-Indian mother. For the foregoing
reasons we conclude appellant lacks standing to invoke the ICWA in this case." Id. See
also In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct App. 1986) (following the rationale of Baby
Boy L.). The Oklahoma Legislature recently rejected this rationale. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10 § 40.1 (\Vest Supp. 1997) ("It shall be the policy of the state to recognize that
Indian tribes and nations have a valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless
of whether or not said children are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent
or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated.").
110. 741 P.2d 1386 (Okla. 1985).
111. Id. at 1387.
112. Id. at 1389. The court agreed with the adoptive parents' position that "the
statute has no application when the child is and has been in the custody of a non-Indian
parent ..•." Id. See also In re S.C. 833 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Okla. 1992) ("The ICWA
was never meant to apply in those cases ... where five and six years had gone by
without the [Indian] father's being involved.").
113. Id. Contrary to the court's position, it should be noted that Congress, in
enacting the ICWA, was concerned with more than just the immediate culture-shock
suffered by Indian children when placed in non-Indian environments. Congress heard
testimony regarding the identity crisis older children faced when they realized they were
different from their adoptive parents and their non-Indian community members. Indian
Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States Senate, 93rd Cong. 117 (1974)
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b. Indian Mothers
Although the majority of cases addressing the existing Indian family
exception concern the infringement of an Indian father's rights, courts
have also applied the exception to subvert an Indian mother's attempt to
invoke the Act. In In re Adoption of T.R.M, 114 the Indiana Supreme
Court applied the exception in a case where an Indian mother had
voluntarily given her five-day old child to a non-Indian couple. 115 In
a one paragraph analysis, the court concluded that the ICWA could not
apply to a case where the purpose and intent of Congress would not be
achieved.1' 6 The court conceded that the biological ancestry of the
child was Indian, but stressed that the child had only spent five days in
an Indian home. 117 The court interpreted the purpose of the ICWA as
protecting "Indian children from improper removal from their existing
Indian family units . . .." 118 The application of the exception to
Indian mothers seems to demonstrate that the parent's gender does not
effect the application of the exception. The exception instead focuses on
the bond between parent and child. The irony of this application is that
the parent and child were never in a position to develop a bond. The
exception under this analysis imposes an almost impossible requirement
on the non-custodial Indian parent.

2.

Cultural 'lies

In the preceding sections, the common factor in the courts' reasoning
was that the Indian parent and the Indian child had not established a
significant bond to constitute an existing Indian family. The second

(statement of Mel Sampson, Northwest Affiliated Tribes, Washington State).
114. 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988). In this case an Indian mother voluntarily placed
her Indian child for adoption with a non-Indian couple. Several months later the mother,
under the ICWA's revocation provisions, attempted to revoke her voluntary consent.
The child's tribe joined the mother in her attempts to set aside the adoption, Id. at 302.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 303. In addition to applying the existing Indian family exception, the
court applied a "best interest of the child" analysis to deny transfer of the matter to tribal
court under section 191 l(b). Id. at 307-08. For a discussion of the controversial use of
the "best interest of the child" standard to deny tribal court jurisdiction see Carriere,
supra note 32.
111. In re Adoption ofT.R.M., 525 N.E.2d at 303. The heart-breaking fact of the
case was that by the time the court delivered its opinion T.R.M. was seven years old.
The biological mother of T.R.M. had been fighting for her child for over six years. Id.
at 301-02.
118. Id. at 303. But cf In re Termination of Parental Rights of D.S., 577 N.E.2d
572, 574 (Ind. 1991) (holding that an Indian mother and child constitute a family under
the ICWA).
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factor courts consider to determine whether the Indian child is part of an
existing Indian family is the strength of the Indian parents' ties to tribal
culture or the reservation. The first case to articulate this requirement
was S.A. v. E.J.P. 119 Factually, S.A. v. E.J.P. was similar to cases
involving an unwed non-Indian mother placing an Indian child for
adoption. What distinguished S.A. v. E.J.P. was that the illegitimate
child had lived with her Indian father and paternal grandmother for
approximately one month prior to her placement with the non-Indian
adoptive couple. 120 Here, the court could not rely on the position that
there was no bond between the parent and child. Instead, the court
effectively determined that despite the fact that the father was an
enrolled Cherokee Indian, he could not constitute an "Indian family"
because he did not live on the reservation and because the child did not
participate in tribal customs. 121
The requirement of significant tribal or cultural ties has also been
applied in a case involving an Indian mother. In In re Adoption of
Crews, 122 the court applied the exception to prevent an Indian mother
(Crews) from revoking her consent to adoption by a non-Indian couple.
The facts of this case are sigrrificantly different from all others invoking
the exception. When Crews arranged for the adoption of her child, she
was not an enrolled member of any tribe and only suspected that she
might have Indian ancestry. 123 Following the adoption, Crews changed
her mind and investigated her ancestry in hopes of being able to apply
119. 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990). This case involves a daughter born
to a seventeen-year old non-Indian mother and a fifteen-year old one-eighth Cherokee
Indian father (S.A.). After her birth, the baby daughter lived with her mother and
maternal grandmother. When the daughter was approximately eight-months old she went
to live with S.A. and his mother (the paternal grandmother). After four weeks, the
paternal grandmother sought full custody of the baby, but the maternal grandmother
would not consent. The maternal grandmother instead made arrangements for the child
to live with a maternal great aunt and uncle. Approximately two years later the maternal
great aunt and uncle petitioned for adoption, S.A. appealed the adoption on the basis
that the trial court failed to follow the ICWA. The Cherokee tribe did not intervene in
the action. Id. at 1187-88.
120. Id. at 1188.
121. Id. at I 189-90. The court stated specifically: "The child may be an Indian
child, as defined by the act, by virtue of her biological father." Id. at 1189. The court
further stated: "The child has had minimal contact with her father. She has had no
involvement in tribal activities or any participation in Indian culture. The evidence
reflects that the father has had only minimal contact with the reservation." Id.
122. 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992).
123. Id. at 306-08.
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ICWA to revoke her voluntary consent to adoption. 124 Crews' investigations revealed that she was indeed Indian and that both she and her
child were eligible for membership with the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma.125 The Choctaw Nation intervened in the action and joined Crews
in appealing the adoption. 126
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the adoption by refusing to
apply the ICWA. The ICWA was not applicable, the court held, because
the child had never been part of an existing Indian family. The court
apparently refused to recognize Crews as an Indian mother.1 27 Additionally, the court noted that neither Crews nor the Choctaw Nation
alleged that the child would grow up in an Indian environment if
returned to Crews. 128 The court did, however, limit the application of
the exception to the particular facts of the case. 129
Application of the significant cultural ties requirement is not limited
to cases where the tribe had no prior contact with the Indian parents or
child. The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Rye v. Weasel, 130 recently
adopted the requirement in a case involving a tribal court ward. The
child in Rye was an enrolled member of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe. 131 Shortly after the child's birth her biological mother voluntarily placed her with Kim and Leilani Weasel. 132 The tribal court
subsequently granted the Weasel's temporary custody and adjudicated
the child a tribal court ward. 133 The child lived with the Weasels for
approximately ten years and when Kim and Leilani divorced the state
circuit court awarded custody to Leilani. 134 Prior to the award, the
tribal court unsuccessfully attempted to intervene under ICWA and
requested transfer of the matter to tribal court. The tribal court also
ordered that the child be returned to the reservation. 135

124. Id. at 308. The facts specifically state: "Crews testified in a deposition that
she was unaware of her Choctaw blood until after B. was born and had only researched
her heritage in order to reinstate her parental rights." Id.
125. Id. at 307.
126. Id. at 308.
127. Crews, 825 P.2d at 310. The court specifically stated: "Neither Crews nor her
family has ever lived on the Choctaw reservation in Oklahoma and there are no plans
to relocate the family from Seattle to Oklahoma." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 311. The court specifically stated: "It is within the narrow circumstances presented by the specific facts of this case that we find ICWA not applicable." Id.
130. 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996).
131. Id. at 259.
132. Id. Kim Weasel was a Standing Rock Sioux tribal member. Leilani Weasel
claimed Indian heritage, but was not a member of any Indian tribe. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 259-60.·
135. Id. at 259.
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In adopting the existing Indian family exception, the Kentucky court
focused on the child's and foster family's level of cultural awareness.136
However, awareness alone is apparently not enough to
constitute an Indian family. The Rye court expected the Indian family
to "adopt [Indian] culture as a day to day way of life ...." 137 The
court additionally extended the exception to negate a tribe's exclusive
jurisdiction over tribal court wards. 138 The court held that wardship
should not affect application of the existing Indian family exception
because it is an exception to the ICWNs jurisdictional provisions.1 39
The tribe, the court stated, only "retained nominal legal wardship .
n140

The Kentucky court in Rye relied in part on a Louisiana: appellate
court case, Hampton v. J.A.L. 141 In Hampton, the court held that an
eleven-sixteenths Sioux mother who had lived on her tribe's reservation
until age nine, lacked the cultural ties needed to invoke the ICWA. 142
The court stressed that the Sioux mother had lost interest in her tribal

136. The court noted: "Kayla [the child] is aware of her Indian heritage but has not
lived in a Tribal Indian home. Traditional Sioux religious practices have not been
observed in her home, nor have tribal dress or language . . . . She knows some words
and phrases of the native Sioux language but cannot speak conversationally in it." Id.
at 260.
137. Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 263.
138. Id. Section 191 l(a) grants tribes exclusive jurisdiction in Indian Child Welfare
cases "[w]here an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, ... notwithstanding the
residence or domicile of the child." 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(a) (1994).
139. Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 263. The court specifically states: "The [existing Indian
family exception] is an exception to the jurisdictional provisions of the ICWA which
does not apply to the facts of this case and is not altered by residence, domicile or
wardship." Id.
140. Id. The "nominal" wardship was apparently based on the tribes lack of contact
\vith the child over the years and declining to financially assist the child in a medical
emergency. Id.
141. 658 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 1995).
142. Id. at 337.
J.L. [the biological mother] is 11/16 Indian blood and is a member of her
father's tribe, the Cheyenne River Sioux. She was born on the Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation in South Dakota (her mother's tribe), and lived there for
nine years. After her father died, she moved with her mother and siblings off
the reservation. Except for a short two-week stay with her aunt at Standing
Rock in November 1994, she has not lived on a reservation since.
Id. at 332.
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culture and had provided no proof her child would be exposed to that
culture. 143
The Crews, Rye, and Hampton decisions raise difficult procedural
questions for jurisdictions that follow the existing Indian family
exception. Must the Indian parent and tribe affirmatively plead that the
child will ultimately be united with its tribal culture to invoke application of the ICWA? Does the "Indian parent'' need to be a member of a
recognized tribe at the commencement of child custody proceedings? 144
Must the Indian family prove their "Indian-ness" by adopting traditional
religion, dress, and language? Trial courts following the exception
cannot look to the ICWA for guidance in answering these questions
because the ICWA does not have a "cultural ties" requirement. A 1996
decision from the California Court of Appeal, Second District is the first
on the appellate level to address these questions. In In re Bridget
R., 145 the appellate court adopted the existing Indian family exception
(limited to a cultural ties requirement) and remanded an Indian child
custody matter to the state trial court for proceedings to determine
whether there was an existing Indian family. Bridget R. involved
voluntary adoption proceedings for twin Indian girls. The Indian father,
after initially lying about his Indian heritage, attempted to invoke the
ICWA to revoke his voluntary consent to adoption of his twin children.146 The tribe also sought to intervene once they received notice
of the adoption. 147

143. Id. at 336-37. The court held:
In sum, we find that the adoption of [the child] will not cause the breakup of
an existing Indian family or removal of a child from an Indian environment.
The child has never participated in Indian culture or heritage and more
importantly based on the evidence presented, would not be exposed to such
culture in the future even if returned to her biological mother or her family.
Id. at 337. But cf. Owens v. Willock, No. 29,595-CA, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 375, at
*7-8 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1997) (holding Hampton distinguishable because the present case
involved a tribal ward). "[T]he parties do not dispute the fact that this is a 'child
custody proceeding', and ... stipulated that [the child] is a lineal descendant of [a]
native village ... and, thus, would be an 'Indian child' under the ICWA. Since this is
a child custody proceeding involving an Indian child, we conclude that the ICWA is
applicable." Id. at *8-9.
144. In concurrence Judge Anderson adopted this position. He stated that the
definition of "Indian child" required that the Indian parent was a member of an Indian
tribe. The Judge reasoned that it was membership, not ancestry, that triggered the
application of the ICWA. Id. at 312-13.
145. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (1996).
146. Id. at 1493, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517. The father initially told his attorney of
his Indian heritage. His attorney told him this fact would impede the adoption
proceedings. In further adoption proceedings he hid his Indian heritage. Id.
141. Id. at 1495, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
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In adopting the existing Indian family exception, the court reasoned
that the ICWA should not apply if neither the child nor the parent had
lived on the reservation or maintained significant social, economic, or
cultural ties to the tribe. 148 The court held that constitutional limits on
the ICWA required a finding by the trial court that the biological Indian
parents had significant ties with their tribe, Indian community, or Indian
culture. The court reasoned that without such ties, application of the
ICWA based on the Indian child's membership or eligibility for
membership runs afoul of the Constitution. First, the court held that
application would interfere with rights ordinarily reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment. Second, the court held that application
would violate a child's right to due process and equal protection under
the Fifth Amendment. 149
The court also established procedures for determining whether the
child was part of an existing Indian family. First, the court held that the
biological Indian parents and the tribe would bear the burden of proving
the parents maintained significant ties to the tribe. 150 Next, the court
held that the ties must be between the Indian parent and the tribe and not
between extended family members and the tribe. The court reasoned
that the Indian parents should not be allowed to rely on ''blood relatives
to bootstrap themselves into an application of ICWA."151 Finally, the
court held that the determination of whether the Indian parents maintained significant ties with the tribe must be based on ties existing at the
time they voluntarily relinquished their child. 152

148. Id. at 1500, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
149. Bridget R. 41 Cal App. 4th at 1512, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529-30.
150. Id. at 1513, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 530. The court reasoned that "[i]t is they who
seek to set aside the relinquishment of parental rights which were otherwise final and
binding under California law." Id. Ironically, this places the burden on the Indian
parent to prove they are indeed Indian.
151. Id. at 1514, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531. The tribe contended that by focusing on
the nuclear family, instead of the extended family the court once again ignores family
dynamics the ICWA sought to protect The court dismisses this contention by essentially
arguing that the Indian parents chose adoption instead of refuge with the tribe. Because
they made a voluntary relinquishment, they must now prove they had a significant
relationship with the tribe. However, the parents voluntary relinquishment of the
children has nothing to do with their cultural ties. Additionally, the argument places the
parents' desires for adoption over the tribe rights and interests in the Indian child. Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
152. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1514, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531. Note that under
this requirement the mother in Crews would have been summarily denied application of
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Courts have not universally adopted the Bridget R. court's procedural
approach. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District adopted the
existing Indian family exception in In re Alexandria Y., 153 but rejected
the Bridget R. court's required findings of significant social, economic,
or cultural ties to the tribe. Unwilling to limit the exception, the court
held that a finding of an existing Indian family would "depend on the
unique facts of each situation."154

VI. A CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION
A.

Plain Language of the ICWA

The first, and most serious, flaw of the existing Indian family
exception is that it ignores the plain language of the ICWA. There are
only two requirements for invocation of the ICWA. First, the child must
be an Indian child. An Indian child is defined as a child who is a tribal
member or a biological child of a tribal member and who is eligible for
tribal membership. 155 There are no limitations on where the child
resides or with whom a child lives. 156 The second requirement to
invoke the ICWA is that the proceeding must be a child custody
proceeding. Child custody proceedings include foster care placement
proceedings, termination of parental rights proceedings, preadoptive
placement proceedings, and adoptive placement proceedings. 157 There
are only two exceptions to the definition of child custody proceedings:
child custody proceedings in divorce matters and juvenile delinquency
matters. 158
Courts applying the existing Indian family exception add a third
requirement for invocation of the ICWA, an Indian family. 159 However, under general rules of statutory construction, express exceptions serve

the ICWA. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
153. 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (1996).
154. Id. at 1493, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686. The court stated:
We agree with Bridget R. that recognition of the existing Indian family
[exception] is necessary to avoid serious constitutional flaws in the ICWA.
But we disagree with its holding that the [exception] cannot come into play
unless the child and both his parents lack a significant relationship with Indian
life. We are not willing to so limit the exception .•.• [W]hether there is an
existing Indian family is dependent on the unique facts of each situation.
Id.
155. 25 u.s.c. § 1903(4) (1994).
156. In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 932 (Id. 1993).
157. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1994). See supra note 24.
158. In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. App. 1986).
159. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
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to exclude any other exceptions. 160 If Congress had anticipated further
exceptions to ICWA's application, it would have included them in the
list of express exceptions. 161 To the contrary, the ICWA contains no
provision requiring an Indian child be part of an existing Indian family
to trigger application of the ICWA.

B.

Congressional Intent

The basic premise of the existing Indian family exception is that
Congress only intended the ICWA to apply when an Indian child is
removed from an existing Indian family. As authority for this congressional intent argument, courts often cite the ICWA!s legislative
history. 162 Additionally, courts cite isolated provisions of the ICWA,
including a portion of Congress' declared policy,163 a congressional
finding, 164 and individual procedural provisions. 165 The citation of
these authorities, however, is misleading. The courts skew the full
meaning of the history and provisions by relying on isolated portions of
these authorities. As the following sections will demonstrate, the
ICWA's full legislative history, policy, findings, and provisions do not
160. In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d at 156 (as authority for this proposition the
court cites Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) and 2A Statutes
and Statutory Construction § 47.11 at 145 (rev. 4th ed. 1984)). See also A.B.M. v.
M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1982); In re S.R., 323 N.W.2d 885 (S.D. 1982).
161. See In re D.A.C. No. 950573-CA, 1997 LEXIS 17, at *17 (Ut App. Feb. 27,
I 997) ("Congress created exceptions to application ofICWA for juvenile delinquency
and divorce custody proceedings. Thus, Congress made policy decisions to limit
application in other circumstances, but not in this situation.'').
162. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982).
163. Id. "Section 1902 of the Act makes it clear that it is the declared policy of
Congress that the Act is to adopt minimum federal standards 'for the removal of Indian
children from their [Indian] families."' Id.
164. The court cites section 1901(4), stating that "an alarmingly high percentage of
Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them ...." Id. The court fails to reference section 1901(3) of the findings, which
states that "there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity
of Indian tribes than their children .•. .'' 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1994). The court also
fails to reference section 1901(5), which states that "the States, exercising their
recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings • . . have often failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people ... .'' 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)
(1994).
165. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175 (Those sections cited include:
the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of section 191l(a); the preventative measures
provisions of section 1912 (d); section 1912(e) and (f); and sections 1914, 1916(b), 1920,
and 1922.).
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support the existing Indian family exception and are in fact contrary to
its basic premise and application. Congress' intent in enacting the
ICWA was not limited to existing Indian families.

1. Legislative History
As previously stated, a primary argument courts applying the existing
Indian family exception rely on is that the legislative history behind the
ICWA supports the rationale for the exception. 166 However, a full
analysis of the legislative history cannot support this conclusion. The
history of the ICWA shows that Congress was concerned with more than
just the immediate effect the removal of an Indian child would have on
a family.
The House report accompanying the ICWA shows that Congress was
concerned with the right of the child to participate in his valuable
cultural heritage. 167 Congress addressed this concern in analyzing the
propriety of defining "Indian child" as a potential tribal member instead
of a current tribal member. Congress wished to assure that potential
members were not denied their cultural heritage simply because their
name did not yet appear on a tribal roll. 168 Congress was concerned
with the rights of Indian children as Indians. 169 Additionally, Congress
was concerned about the long-term effects this removal would have on
the Indian child and, on the child's tribe. Congress sought to ~rotect the
Indian tribe's right to retain its children in tribal society. 17 Finally,
Congress was concerned about state courts' and agencies' inability to
understand the dynamics of Indian tribal culture. Congress wished to
insure that in certain circumstances state courts would not have
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. 171 Congress perceived the

166. Id. at 175.
167. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 7530,
7539. The House Report specifically provides:
[The] minor, perhaps infant, Indian does not have the capacity to initiate the
formal mechanical, procedure necessary to become enrolled in his tribe to
take advantage of the very valuable cultural and property benefits flowing
therefrom. Obviously, Congress has power to act for their protection. The
constitutional and plenary power of Congress over Indians and Indian tribes
and affairs cannot be made to hinge upon the cranking into operation of a
mechanical process established under tribal law, particularly with respect to
Indian children who, because of their minority, cannot make a reasoned
decision about their tribal and Indian identity.
Id.
168. Id.
169. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 45.
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states as part of the problem it tried to correct in enacting the
ICWA. 172 Indeed, the main purpose of the statute is not to provide
minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families, but to curtail state authority over Indian child custody
matters. 173

2.

Declared Policy

Courts also rely on individual ICWA provisions to support the
rationale for the existing Indian family exception. The first provisionsbased argument is founded on Congress' policy and intent in enacting
the ICWA. Supporters theorize that Congress' intent in enacting the
ICWA was to provide minimum federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their homes. This interpretation of Congress' intent
is derived from the policy declaration contained in the ICWA provisions.
The provision establishes a two-fold congressional policy. First,
Congress wished to protect the best interests of Indian children. Second,
Congress desired to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families. Congress declared three ways this two-fold policy would
be accomplished: first, by establishing minimum federal standards for
the removal of Indian children from their families; second, by placing
removed Indian children in foster or adoptive homes that reflected Indian
values and culture; and third, by helping tribes operate child and family
service programs. 174
The argument supporting the existing Indian family exception
misconstrues the congressional policy by focusing on a single passage:
minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families. But, considered in its entirety, Congress' policy concerns more
than maintenance of familial relationships. Congress spoke of the

172. Id.
173. Id. at 45 n. 17.
174. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994). Section 1902 provides in full:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the
best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimwn Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of
such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values
of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the
operation of child and family service programs.
Id.
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interests of children, families, and tribes. Stability and security of the
tribe was a primary concern. Limiting the application of the ICWA by
applying the existing Indian family exception limits the security and
stability of the tribe, which Congress wished to protect, by effectively
stifling the tribe's voice in custody proceedings.

3.

Congressional Findings

The second provisions-based argument used to support the existing
Indian family exception rests on a congressional finding. Congress, in
enacting the ICWA, recognized that a special relationship exists between
the United States and American Indians. 175 In recognition of this
special relationship, Congress promulgated five findings regarding Indian
children, families, and tribes. First, Congress found that the United
States Constitution's Commerce Clause provided Congress plenary
power over Indian affairs. 176 Second, Congress found that it was
responsible for the protection of tribal resources. m Third, Congress
found that the Indian children are the tribes' most vital resource and that
the United States has a direct interest in protecting those children who
are Indian tribal members or eligible for membership. 178 Fourth,
Congress found that non-tribal agencies were removing Indian children
from their families and placing them in non-Indian homes at an alarming
rate. 179 Fifth, Congress found that the states, in exercising jurisdiction

175. 25 u.s.c. § 1901 (1994). See FELIX s. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 220-228 (1982) (discussing the trust relationship between the United States
Government and the Indian tribes).
176. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1) (1994). Section 1901(1) provides: "[C]lause 3, section
8, article I of the United States Constitution provides that 'The Congress shall have
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce .•. with Indian tribes and, through this and other
constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs . . .." Id.
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (omissions in original)).
177. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2) (1994). Section 1901(2) provides: "Congress, through
statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the
responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources .
. . ." Id.
178. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1994). Section 1901(3) provides: "[T]here is no
resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity oflndian tribes than
their children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting
Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
...." Id.
179. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1994). Section 1901(4) provides: "[A]n alarmingly high
percentage oflndian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by non-tribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and
institutions ...." Id.
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over Indian child custody matters, often failed to recognize tribal cultural
and social standards. 180
Proponents of the existing Indian family exception cite the fourth
finding as supporting Congress' supposed desire to limit the ICWA to
cases involving an existing Indian family. This finding provides that
Congress enacted the ICWA to stop the unwarranted removal of Indian
children from their homes. However, the third finding provides that
Congress enacted the ICWA to protect the tribes' interest in maintaining
a relationship with its members and potential members.181 This finding
was not limited to Indian children living in Indian families. The interest
broadly encompassed current or potential tribal members.
The findings also show Congress' suspicion of the state courts' ability
to properly handle Indian child welfare matters. 182 The existing Indian
family exception's emphasis on a single Indian family is contrary to the
overall tenor of the findings. Congress recognized the special relationship between tribes and their members or even potential members, and
found that state courts failed to recognize such relationships. The
existing Indian family exception is continuing evidence of this failure.

4.

Procedural Provisions

Courts supporting the existing Indian family exception also cite
individual provisions of the ICWA as evidence of Congress' intent to
limit application of the ICWA to existing Indian families. 183 Supporters cite the exclusive jurisdiction provisions for Indian children living on
their reservation; 184 provisions requiring remedial services prior to the
breakup of an Indian family; 185 provisions referring to continued

180. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1994). Section 1901(5) provides: "[T]he States,
exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through
administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal
relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families." Id.
I 8 I. See supra note 178.
182. See supra note 180.
183. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (1982).
184. Id. The court specifically stated: "Section 191l(a) provides exclusive
jurisdiction in the Indian tribe 'over any child who resides or is domiciled within the
reservation .... "' Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)).
185. Id. The court specifically stated: "Section 1912(d) provides that efforts should
be made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family ...." Id.
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custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian; 186 provisions
referring to removal from the parent or Indian custodian; 187 and other
general placement or removal provisions. 188 These provisions, supporters contend, show that the removal of children from existing Indian
families and the breakup of those families is the underlying thread of the
ICWA. 189
Once again, however, the argument supporting the existing Indian
family exception fails to acknowledge provisions contrary to its position,
Several provisions evidence Congress' intent to protect tribal interests as
well as to maintain Indian families. First, tribal courts have concurrent,
but preferred, jurisdiction over child custody matters regarding Indian
children domiciled off the reservation. 190 Second, the tribe has the
right to intervene at any time in state court proceedings over tribal
members or potential tribal members.191 Third, state courts must give
tribal court custody determinations full faith and credit. 192 Fourth,
state courts must notify tribes of pending custody matters involving
tribal children. 193 Further, an Indian child's relationship with its tribe
is protected by allowing adult adopted children to seek information
regarding their tribal affiliation. 194 Finally, Congress appropriates
funds for both on and off reservation Indian family service programs.195 These provisions evidence Congress' intent to protect tribal
interests as well as to maintain Indian families. 196

186. Id. The court specifically stated: "[S]ubsections (e) and (f) [of section 1912]
refer to 'the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian' and the
potential for emotional or physical damage to the child." Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(e)-(f)).
187. Id. The court specifically stated: "Section 1914 again refers to the removal
of the child from the parent or the Indian custodian." Id.
188. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1916(b), 1920, 1922)).
189. Id. The court specifically concluded: "[The provisions] reflect the underlying
thread that runs throughout the entire Act to the effect that the Act is concerned with the
removal oflndian children from an existing Indian family unit and the resultant breakup
of the Indian family." Id.
190. 25 U.S.C. § 19ll(b) (1994).
191. 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(c) (1994).
192. 25 U.S.C. § 19ll(d) (1994).
193. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1994).
194. 25 U.S.C. § 1917 (1994). Section 1917 specifically provides:
Upon application by an Indian individual who has reached the age of eighteen
and who was the subject of an adoptive placement, the court which entered the
final decree shall inform such individual of the tribal affiliation, if any, of the
individual's biological parents and provide such other information as may be
necessary to protect any rights flowing from the individual's tribal relationship.
Id.

u.s.c. § 1933 (1994).
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989),
See also In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989) ("Reliance on a
195.
196.
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The procedural provisions of the ICWA evidence nothing more than
a plan for how Indian child custody proceedings will proceed.
Provisions regarding Indian families should not be isolated to support the
conclusion that the ICWA only applies to existing Indian families. The
provisions of the ICWA must be interpreted in their entirety. The
dominant theme of the ICWA, when viewed in its entirety, is to curtail
state authority over Indian child custody matters. 197 The procedural
provisions therefore do not support the existing Indian family exception.
The exception seeks to expand rather than to curtail state court authority.

5.

Failed Amendments

Courts also reason that the Senate's failure to pass ICWA amendments
in 1987 supports the proposition that Congress intended the ICWA to
apply only to cases involving existing Indian families. Senate Bill 1976
would have overruled the existing Indian family exception by making
the ICWA's application "mandatory regardless of whether the child had
'previously lived in Indian County, in an Indian cultural environment or
with an Indian parent."' 198 The bill, however, failed to leave the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. 199 This failure, certain courts
contend, evidences Congress' awareness of the existing Indian family
exception and, therefore, its support of the exception.200
Contrary to this rationale, Congress' failure to amend the ICWA
cannot provide a logical basis for concluding that Congress supports the
existing Indian family exception. The courts espousing this theory offer
no evidence that the 1987 amendments failed because Congress objected
to the bill's rejection of the existing Indian family exception. The bill
made sweeping changes to the ICWA, including adding and expanding

requirement that the Indian child be part of an Indian family for the Act to apply would
undercut the interests of Indian tribes and Indian children themselves that Congress
sought to protect through notice, jurisdiction and other procedural protections set out in
ICWA.").
197. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45 n.17.
198. In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935,945 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, Fort Peck
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Tubridy, 116 S. Ct 1320 (1996) (quoting S. 1976, 100th
Cong. § 4(1) (1987)).
199. Id.
200. Id. See also Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996); Hampton v.
J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335 {La. App. 1995), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 478 (La. 1995),
and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 1549 (1996); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Okla. 1992).
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definitions,2° 1 allowing denial of transfer to tribal court when request
to transfer was untimely,202 requiring notice for preadoptive and
adoptive placement,203 establishing an Indian child welfare committee,204 and extending the ICWA to the aboriginal peoples of Canada.205 It is paradoxical to conclude that Congress supports the existing
Indian family exception because it failed to pass legislation that, among
other things, would have overruled the exception.206 The better
reasoned view is that the intent of the 100th Congress in failing to enact
the amendments (whatever that intent may have been), cannot be
ascribed to the earlier Congress which enacted the ICWA.207

6.

Supreme Court Interpretation

The strongest blow to the existing Indian family exception comes from
the only United States Supreme Court case to interpret the ICWA. In
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,208 the Supreme
Court, in determining the effect of domicile on the ICWA, analyzed
Congress' legislative intent in enacting the ICWA.

20 I. S. 1976, 100th Cong. (1987). The bill, among other things, added definitions
for "domicile" (Section 4(2)), "family" (Section 4(3)), "qualified expert witness" (Section
4(1 I), and "residence" (Section 4(13); and expanded the definition of"parent" (Section
4(10)).
202. Id. § tol(b).
203. Id. § 102(a).
204. Id. § 114.
205. Id. § 116.
206. This paradox is evidenced by 104th Congress' failure to pass legislation which
would have codified the existing Indian family exception. See supra notes 61-64 and
accompanying text. Under the S.S. court's (and similar court's) rationale, this failure
would evidence Congress' rejection of the existing Indian family exception. It is highly
doubtful that the S.S. court, and its followers, would support such a result.
207. See Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So.2d 331, 340-41 (La. App.) (Stewart J.,
dissenting), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 478 (La. 1995), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1549
(1996). "[T]he views ofa subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the
intent of an earlier one." Id. at 340 (quoting Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 103 (1989). Justice Stewart compared the failure of the ICWA
amendments to the failure of ERISA amendments at issue in Bruch. The amendments
concerned the standard of review in decisions denying insurance benefits. The failed
ERISA bill proposed a de nova standard of review which was contrary to the arbitrary
and capricious standard employed by most courts. Firestone argued that Congress'
failure to approve the legislation evidenced Congress' support for the arbitrary and
capricious standard. The Court rejected this argument stating "[t]he bill's demise may
have had nothing to do with Congress's view on the propriety of de novo review.
Without more, we cannot ascribe to Congress any acquiescence in the arbitrary and
capricious standard." Id. (quoting Bruch, 489 U.S. at 103. Likewise, Justice Stewart
concluded that "[w]ithout more [be could not] ascribe such an intent to Congress,
especially where the proposed amendments apparently were never placed before the
whole Congress, but only a committee." Id. at 340-4 I.
208. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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Holyfield involved the adoption of illegitimate twin boys born on
December 29, 1985. The unwed parents were both members of the
Mississippi Band of the Choctaw Indians and were domiciled and
resided on the tribal reservation. However, the twins were born in
Harrison County, Mississippi, which is approximately 200 miles from
the tribal reservation.209 On January 10, 1986, the mother consented
to the adoption of the twins. The following day the father also
consented to the adoption. A final decree of adoption issued on January
28, 1986. The decree did not mention the twins' Indian heritage or the
ICWA.210
Two months later the Choctaw tribe alleged exclusive jurisdiction over
the twins and petitioned the court to vacate the adoption decree. The
trial court overruled the petition stating the tribe never established
jurisdiction because the twins were never physically on the reservation
and because the mother went to great lengths to leave the reservation
before giving birth to the twins. The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed this order.211
On review, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the tribe had
exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings. Jurisdiction under
the ICWA, the Court stated, is based on the domicile of the child. The
Mississippi court had applied state law to conclude that the twins were
domiciled in Harrison County. This application of state law, the Court
held, was not appropriate to determine a pivotal issue of the ICWA. The
Court instead applied the general common law that the domicile of a
child follows his mother. Because neither party ever disputed that both
parents were domiciled on the reservation, the Court granted exclusive
jurisdiction to the tribe.
In granting the tribe exclusive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
analyzed not only the policy behind the ICWA, but the tribe's place in
the ICWA. The purpose of the ICWA, the Court noted, was not simply
to curb the removal of Indian children from Indian homes, but to protect
those children's rights and the tribe's right to retain Indian children in

209. The record on appeal reveals that the biological parents intentionally left the
reservation prior to the birth of the twins in an attempt to avoid application of the ICWA
in the intended adoption proceedings. Id. at 40.
210. Id. at 38.
211. Id. at 39.
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tribal society.212 Additionally, the Court noted that Congress was
concerned that the actions of state authorities often infringed these rights.
According to the Court, states and their courts were part of the problem
Congress was attempting to remedy in enacting the ICWA.213 Because
of these concerns, the court reasoned, Congress would not have left the
pivotal jurisdictional issue (the definition of domicile) to interpretation
by state courts based on state law.214
The Court's analysis of where the child's tribe fits into the ICWA
shows a strong concern for tribal rights. First, the ICWA was intended
to protect not just Indian children and parents, but also to protect the
child's tribe.215 Evidence of this intent is found in the numerous rights
granted to tribes under the ICWA. Second, this tribal interest is at least
equal to the interest of the individual Indian parents. Not only do tribes
have a recognized interest under the ICWA, but that interest is the core
of the Act.216 The actions of individual tribal members cannot defeat
this tribal interest.217
Finally, the Court recognized the detrimental impact on Indian children
of being raised in non-Indian homes. The Court reasoned that this
impact is a concern that reaches beyond the individual parents.218
Removing an Indian child from tribal culture causes not only social, but

212. Id. at 37. The Court specifically stated: "The ICWA thus ... 'seeks to
protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community
and tribe in retaining its children in its society."' Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at
23 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546),
213. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 35-36. The Court stated: "'[T]he states['] ... judicial
bodies[ J have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations oflndian people and
the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families."' Id.
(quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)).
214. Id. at 45-47. Additionally, the lack of unifonnity caused by a state law
domicile definition supported a single unifonn definition. If courts used a state law
definition, tribal jurisdiction over children born off the reservation would vary by state.
Mothers, wishing to avoid the ICWA, could simply cross state lines prior to giving birth.
Id.
215. Id. at 49. The Court specifically stated: "Congress was concerned not solely
about the interest ofindian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes
themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." Id.
216. Id. at 52. The court specifically stated:
The protection of this tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, which
recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but
on a parity with the interest of the parents. This relationship between Indian
tribes and Indian children domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in
other ethnic cultures found in the United States.
Id. (citing In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-70 (Utah 1986)).
217. Id.
218. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 50-51.
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psychological, damage to many Indian children.219 The Court not only
concluded that it was in the Indian child's best interest to maintain its
relationship to the tribe, but that the ICWA was based on this assumption.220
The Supreme Court's analysis of the ICWA is directly contrary to the
basic premise of the existing Indian family exception. The exception
theorizes that the intent of Congress in enacting the ICWA was to
provide minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children
from existing Indian families. However, the Supreme Court stated that
the ICWNs main purpose is to protect the rights of the child and the
tribe. The concern behind the ICWA is not simply a family concern but
a community concern. The Congress established the ICWA to aid tribes
in retaining Indian children in the Indian community. By focusing on
families, the exception denies protection of any potential relationship
between the child and the tribe.
Indeed, several courts have held that Holyfield implicitly overrules the
existing Indian family exception.221 These courts reason that the
existing Indian family exception places too much weight on the interests
of individual families.222 Citing Holyfield s extensive review of the
ICWA's legislative history, these courts hold that the exception is
contrary to the tribal interests and sovereignty Congress sought to protect
and strengthen through the ICWA.223 Similarly, one court upholding

219. Id. The Court specifically stated: "'Removal of Indian children from their
cultural setting seriously impacts a long-term tribal survival and has damaging social and
psychological impact on many individual Indian children."' Id. (quoting S. REP. No.
597, 95th Cong. 52 (1977)). Testimony at congressional hearings provided that the
psychological damage was due not only to the initial removal, but to the effect of being
a racial Indian in a non-Indian community. See Indian Child Welfare Program,

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs 93rd Cong. 54 (1974) (statement of Dr. Carl Mindell, child psychiatrist).
220. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 50 n.24.
221. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 931 (Idaho 1993); In re Adoption of
Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990); In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Mich.
1996). Cf. In re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206, 208-09 (Or. App. 1992) (citing
Holyfield for the proposition that the existing Indian family exception is contrary to the
policies Congress sought to protect through the ICWA.)
222. Baade, 462 N.W.2d at 489 ("[I]t is incorrect, when assessing ICWA's
applicability to a particular case, to focus only upon the interests of an existing family.").
223. Elliot, 554 N.W.2d at 36-37 ("In light of the [Supreme Court's reasoning in
Holyfield], we hold that an 'existing Indian family' exception would be in direct conflict
with the concept of tribal sovereignty and the important public policy of improving tribal
ties reflected in the ICWA.").
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the existing Indian family exception has recognized that Holyfield at
least limits the exception. In In re Bridget R., a California appellate
court held that Holyfield limits the exception's application to cases where
the court finds the parent or child does not have significant social,
political, or cultural ties to the tribe. The exception, this court held,
cannot be used to defeat the ICWA's application merely because the
child has never lived with an Indian family. 224

C. ·Tribal Interests
As previously discussed, the basic premise of the existing Indian
family exception is flawed because it is contrary to the ICWA's full
congressional intent. These flaws are additionally evidenced by the
exception's infringement upon tribal interests recognized by the ICWA
and the Supreme Court in Holyfield. By applying the exception, the
Indian child's tribe is deprived of its right to intervene in child custody
matters. Courts adopting the exception fail or refuse to recognize the
tribal interests Congress intended to protect in enacting the ICWA.
One case that recognized the tribal interests protected under the ICWA
is In re S.B.R. 225 In In re S.B.R., the court refused to follow the
existing Indian family exception because, in addition to ignoring the
plain language of the ICWA, it ignored tribal interests in Indian child
custody matters. The court concluded that tribes are to play a central
role in custody proceedings of Indian children.226 The court further
concluded that the legislative findings failed to support the existing
Indian family exception as they include findings that the relationship
between the child and the tribe should be protected.227 To protect the
values Congress recognized in adopting the ICWA, the court reasoned,

224. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1500-01, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 521-22
(1996) ("Holyfield establishes, by clear implication, that an application of ICWA will
not be defeated by the mere fact that an Indian child has not himself (or herself) been
part ofan Indian family or community."), cert denied, Cindy R. v. James R., 117 S. Ct.
693 (1997). But cf. In re Alexandria Y. 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1493, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
679, 686 (1996) ("[W]e disagree with [Bridget R. s] holding that the [existing Indian
family exception] cannot come into play unless the child and both parents lack a
significant relationship with Indian life. We are not willing to so limit the [exception]
.... [W]hether there is an existing Indian family is dependent on the unique facts of
each situation.").
225. 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. App. 1986).
226. Id. at I 56.
227. Id. The court specifically stated: "It is in the Indian child's best interest that
its relationship to its tribe be protected." Id.
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the tribes must be allowed to participate in Indian child custody
matters.228
Interestingly, In re S.B.R. differs in two ways from other cases that
apply the exception to adoption proceedings involving illegitimate Indian
children: first, the party appealing is the Indian tribe not the Indian
father; and second, the proceeding involves custody within the extended
maternal family. 229 Perhaps the tribe's strong presence in the matter
resulted in the decision recognizing tribal rights and interests.230
However, presence of strong tribal interests is not necessarily enough
to overcome application of the exception. For example, in Adoption of
Baby Boy D., the court, in adopting the existing Indian family exception,
placed special emphasis on the fact that the father had expressed little
interest in the child.231 However, the dissent recognized that tribal
concerns should not be ignored by applying the existing Indian family
exception. In his dissent,232 Judge Kauger reasoned that a strict
interpretation required application of the ICWA.233 Judge Kauger
stated that the majority failed to consider the tribal concerns due to an
(albeit well-meaning) cultural myopia.234 Child-rearing, the Judge
reasoned, is an essential tribal function. Judge Kauger further reasoned
that Congress recognized this function in section 191l(b) of the ICWA
by requiring transfer to the tribal court when the child is domiciled off
the reservation.235 This provision, he stated, is evidence that the
child's tribal status overrides his domiciliary status.236 Additionally,

228. Id. Judge Swanson dissented to the majority opinion. He opined that the
ICWA's rigid application overturned a lower court order simply because the tribe had
not received notice of the proceedings. Id. at 157.
229. Id. at 155.
230. The father initially objected to the proceedings, but failed to appear at trial and
apparently made no further attempts to intervene in the matter.
231. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
232. Judge Kauger's dissent is partial and only applies to the majority's treatment
and holdings regarding the ICWA. Id. at I 071.
233. Id. at 1073.
234. Id. at 1075.
235. Id. at 1076. Section 191 l(b) states: "In any State court proceeding ...
[involving] an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
child's tribe, the court ... shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe
...." 25 U.S.C. 191 l(b) (1994).
236. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1076.
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Judge Kauger noted that the ICWA makes no distinction regarding a
child's environmental circumstances.237
The New Jersey Supreme Court used a similar rational to refuse
application of the exception in In re Adoption of a Child of Indian
Heritage. 238 In Child of Indian Heritage, an unwed Indian mother
placed her Indian child for adoption with a non-Indian family. The
Indian father and extended family subsequently attempted to vacate the
adoption because it violated the ICWA.239 The mother argued that the
ICWA should not apply because the child's voluntary placement was not
a removal of an Indian child from an Indian family and, therefore, did
not result in the break up of an existing Indian family.240 The court,
however, rejected this argument because it would allow the mother's
voluntary conduct to dictate the ICWNs application.241 Instead, the
court emphasized the rights of the unwed father, the tribe, and the effect
on an Indian child in being placed in a non-Indian home. The effect on
the Indian child and the tribe, the court theorized, was the same whether
the placement by the non-Indian mother was voluntary or not.242
Congress, the court stated, intended to maintain the relationship between
the Indian child and tribe whenever possible.243 The court held that
the existing Indian family exception was contrary to the purpose of the
ICWA. The congressional findings, the court noted, recognized that the
Indian children were the tribes' most vital resource in continuing their
existence. 244

237. Id.
238. 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988).
239. Id. at 928-30. The Indian mother voluntarily arranged for her baby's adoption
prior to his birth on August 17, 1984. On May 24, 1985, the trial court granted the
baby's adoption by a non-Indian couple. The trial court did not apply the ICWA, and
in fact, at no point in the proceedings was there any indication that the child was Indian.
On May 23, 1986, the Indian father moved to vacate the adoption on the basis offraud
and the court's failure to follow the JCWA. Although the tribe declined to intervene due
to a lack of funds, the father's extended Indian family joined him in his attempts to
vacate the adoption.
240. Id. at 931-32.
241. Id. at 932. The court specifically stated: "We disagree with this interpretation
of the Act because it posits as a detenninative jurisdictional test the voluntariness of the
conduct of the mother." Id.
242. Id.
243. Child ofIndian Heritage, 543 A.2d at 932. The court stated: "[C]onsideration
must also be given to the rights of the child's father and Congress' belief that, whenever
possible, it is in an Indian child's best interests to maintain a relationship with his or her
tribe." Id.
244. Id. "'[T)here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children and . . . the United States has a direct
interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children ...• "' Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2)(3)).
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield245 also supports the concern that the
ICWA must be applied to support the interests of the tribe. The
Holyfield decision demostrates that the existing Indian family exception
cannot be used to allow individual actions to evade application of the
ICWA. At least one court has reversed its support for the exception
based on the broad scope of the ICWA envisioned by the Supreme Court
in Holyfield.
Prior to Holyfield, the South Dakota Supreme Court had applied the
existing Indian family exception to a factual situation involving an
adoption by a non-Indian mother's current husband. In that case,
Claymore v. Se",246 the court held that before it could apply the
ICWA, it must first find that the child was a member of an existing
Indian family.247 The court reasoned that although the ICWA did not
specifically require an existing Indian family, such a requirement was
implicit in the ICWA.248 However, following Holyfield the South
Dakota Supreme Court reversed its support for the exception. In In re
Adoption of Baade, 249 the court held that in light of Holyfield, it was

245. 490 U.S. 30 (I 989).
246. 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987). This case centered around the adoption of an
Indian child (Danette) by the husband of her non-Indian mother (Janette Johnson Serr).
Serr gave birth to Danette in 1977. Danette's biological father (Shayne Claymore) was
an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. Although, Claymore never
monetarily contributed to the child's expenses he visited Serr and Danette and
occasionally lived with them. His relationship with mother and daughter did not cease
until Serr began living with her future husband. When Claymore learned of the intended
adoption, he objected and sought to legally establish paternity, child support, and
visitation. He did not attempt to gain custody of Danette. Id. at 651-52.
247. Id. at 654. The court specifically stated: "We believe that the purpose of[sic]
Act suggests that such a finding is a necessary condition for application of the Act" Id.
248. Id. at 653-54. The court also attempted to define Indian family. Acknowledging that the ICWA does not provide a definition, the court looked to Black's Law
Dictionary. Black's stated that, although the definition of family depends on the field
of law in question, it generally consists of parents and children. Based on this the court
concluded that the definition of an Indian family was that of a typical Anglo-nuclear
family. The court acknowledged that situations may exist where an Indian child was not
part of a parent and child unit such as where the child was raised by grandparents. But,
the court concluded that because that was not the situation before it, Danette could not
be considered part of an existing Indian family. Id.
249. 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990) (involving a teenaged Indian father's objection
to his child's adoption).
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incorrect to apply the ICWA only to cases involving an existing
family. 250 The Baade court noted that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ICWA in Holyfield encompassed not only the child and the
family's interests, but the interests of the tribe as well.251 The Baade
court rejected the Baby Boy L. line of cases and adopted the position that
the only prerequisites to application of the ICWA were whether the child
was an "Indian child" and whether the proceeding was a "child custody
proceeding."252
This position was also recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Baby Boy Doe.253 The court determined that Holyfield effectively
undermined the exception's requirement of an existing Indian family.254 The Baby Boy Doe court summarized that the Supreme Court's
application of the ICWA in Holyfield was based on the interest the tribe
has in the tribal children.255 The existing Indian family exception
deprives the tribe of this interest. Under the exception, the court
theorized, a non-Indian mother can easily circumvent the ICWA by
assuring the child has no contact with his father, his family, or any tribal
culture.256 The court further rejected the exception because the ICWA
contained no limitations based on a child's location.257 The court

250. Id. at 489. The court specifically stated: "Consequently, it is incorrect, when
assessing ICWA's applicability to a particular case, to focus only upon the interest of
an e1:isting family." Id.
251. Id. The Baade court specifically quoted Holyfield as follows. '"The numerous
prerogatives accorded the tribe through the ICWA's substantive provision ... must,
accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of individual Indian
children and families, but also the tribes themselves."' Id. (quoting Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49) (omissions in original).
252. Id. at 489-90.
253. 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993). Baby Boy Doe involved a non-Indian mother's
placing her Indian child for adoption with a non-Indian family. Following notice of the
adoption proceedings, the father and tribe petitioned to intervene in the proceedings. Id.
at 927-28. The tribe objected to placement in compliance with the ICWA's placement
preferences. To avoid the ICWA's placement preferences the trial court adopted the
existing Indian family exception. Id.
254. Id. at 933. Alternatively, the trial court had ruled that the child was not an
"Indian child" because the tribe had not conclusively detennined the child was eligible
for membership. Id. at 928. The Court ruled that the trial court misapplied the law in
requiring the tribe to make a conclusive detennination that the child was eligible for
membership to invoke the ICWA. Id. at 930-3 I.
255. Id. at 931.
256. Id. The Baby Boy Doe court specifically stated: "In this case, application of
an Indian family requirement would allow the non-Indian mother to circumvent
application ofICWA and the tribe's interest in the child by making sure the child is kept
away from the reservation and out of contact with the father and his family." Id.
257. Id. at 932.
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concluded that the existing Indian family exception was a judicially
created exception to the ICWA.258
A California Court of Appeal has also reversed a trial court's attempt
to follow the existing Indian family exception. In Adoption of Lindsay
C., 259 the First District Court of Appeal, Division Three, relied on
Holyfield and the express provisions of the ICWA to find that the only
two exceptions to the ICWA were divorce proceedings and juvenile
delinquency proceedings. The court noted the conclusion of one
commentator that the Baby Boy L. court "may have given inappropriate
weight to the wishes of the family."260 The court added that limiting
the application of the ICWA to situations involving removal of Indian
children from existing Indian homes, deprecated the very purpose of the
ICWA-namely, to preserve the parental, tribal, and cultural link to the
Indian child.261
Despite Holyfield, numerous courts steadfastly refuse to accept
Holyfield and the above-described cases as defeating the existing Indian
family exception. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in In re
S.C.,262 held that the exception was not inconsistent with Holyfield.

258. Id. The court reasoned that "In light of the structure and nature of ICWA, it
is inappropriate to use a judicially created exception to circumvent the mandates of
ICWA." Id.
259. 229 Cal. App. 3d 404, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (1991) (involving an adoption of
an illegitimate Indian child by the non-Indian mother's current husband).
260. Id. at 412,280 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (quoting Roger A. Tellinghuisen, The Indian
Child Weijare Act of 1978: A practical Guide with [Limited] Commentary 34 S.D. L.
Rev. 660, 671 (1989). The full quote provided: "After the decision in Holy.field, it
appears that the Kansas court in Baby Boy L. may have given inappropriate weight to
the wishes of the family. The United States Supreme Court seems unlikely to protect
the implied right of the non-Indian mother to entirely exclude the applicability of the Act
which explicitly protects the right of a tribe to intervene in any child custody proceeding
involving an Indian child." Id.
261. Id. at 414, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 200 (quoting In re Crystal K., 226 Cal. App. 3d
655, 664, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 624 (1991)). In re Crystal K. involved a trial court's
refusal to apply the ICWA to a proceeding tenninating a non-custodial Indian father's
parental rights because the matter was within the definition of the divorce proceeding
exception. In re Crystal K., 226 Cal. App. 3rd at 662-63, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 623. The
court rejected this interpretation and reasoned that Holy.field required a broader
interpretation of the ICWA. Id. at 665, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
262. 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992). In re. S.C. involved the objection to the foster
care placement of two Cherokee Indian children by their Indian father. The children,
following their removal from their non-Indian mother, were placed in an Indian foster
care home. The Cherokee tribe approved of the placement of the children and only
requested the father be granted visitation. On appeal the father sought to invalidate the
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Holyfield, the court stated, stood for only two propositions: (1) Federal

law determines the definition of domicile; and (2) domicile of an
illegitimate child is the domicile of the mother.263 The court insisted
that Holyfield must be considered in light of the ICWA's legislative
history and other state court decisions which confined the application of
Holyfield to the two stated propositions.264 However, as previously
explained, the legislative history does not support the exception.265 In
fact, when viewed in its entirety the history supports applying the
Holyfield rational to defeat the exception. The better view is that the
exception is contrary to the interests tribes have in Indian child custody.
The exception should not be applied to deny tribes this interest.

D.

Urban Indians

I. Application Issues
Related to the tribal rights issue is the recent trend of applying the
existing Indian family exception to urban Indians who lack sufficient
cultural ties. This trend of applying the exception when courts
determine that the Indian parent does not have sufficient ties to tribal
culture or the reservation is perhaps the most far reaching and dangerous
of the applications. Application in this situation places an additional,
and unwarranted, burden on urban Indians simply because they do not
live on or near the reservation. Indian parents who, through choice or

placement under section 1914, alleging errors in the trial court proceedings. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court not only held that there were no errors justifying invalidation
under the ICWA, but (perhaps unnecessarily) reinforced its strong support for the
existing Indian family exception. Id. at 1251-52. However, the Oklahoma Legislature
subsequently rejected the existing Indian family exception. OKLA. STAT, ANN. tit. 10
§ 40.1 (West Supp. 1997) ("It shall be the policy of the state to recognize that Indian
tribes and nations have a valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless of
whether or not said children are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or
Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated.").
263. Id. at 1254. The court specifically stated that "Holyfield stands for two
propositions: (!) that federal law pre-empts state law as to the definition of domicile,
and (2) the domicile of an Indian child is that of the mother if the child is born our of
wedlock." Id.
264. Id. at 1254. To support its proposition that other courts have similarly
confined Holyfield, the court cites In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 82 (Mont. 1990) and In re
Termination of the Parental Rights of D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind, 1991). However,
D.S. does not conclusively limit Holyfield to such an application. In fact, the D.S. court
rejected the existing Indian family exception. D.S., 577 N.E.2d at 574 ("We •. , hold
that a mother and child do constitute a 'family'. Furthermore, where the mother is a
Native American Indian, the mother and child, at least presumptively for purposes of
initiating ICWA inquiries, constitute an 'Indian family."'),
265. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
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circumstance, no longer live on the reservation must prove their "Indianness" to courts applying the exception to assure the ICWA's application.
However, this proof requirement is contrary to both Congress' intent in
enacting the ICWA and the plain language of the ICWA.
The ICWA defines Indian as a "person who is a member of an Indian
tribe ...." 266 The ICWA has no limits regarding where that person
must live or what type of cultural activities they must practice. As
Judge Kauger noted in his dissent to Baby Boy D., the ICWA makes no
distinction regarding a child's environmental circumstances.267 In fact,
the legislative history indicates that Congress addressed a similar
question when determining the proper definition of an Indian child. The
Department of Justice, after reviewing the proposed ICWA, recommended that the definition of Indian child be limited to children who were
eligible for membership and in the custody of a tribal parent.268 The
legislature rejected the recommendation. It reasoned that blood
relationship, not the environment of the child, determined the child's
right to participate in tribal culture and property benefits.269
State courts that require tribal cultural ties before they will invoke the
ICWA will open a Pandora's Box of unanswerable questions. How will
state courts determine who is Indian? Will the exception be limited to
urban Indians? Will domicile on a reservation be sufficient? What if
the parent is domiciled on the reservation, but does not participate in
tribal customs or activities? Will they be considered Indian? Must a
parent prove they have attended a significant number of powwows,
sweat lodges, or council meetings before they are considered Indian?
Will tribal experts be called to testify to individual tribal customs?
The major fallacy of this application of the existing Indian family
exception is that it places the decision of who is an Indian with the
entity least equipped to make the decision, the state court. As noted in
Holyfield, Congress perceived the state courts' inability to understand
Indian cultural and tribal dynamics as part of the problem it was

266. 25 u.s.c. § 1903(3) (1994).
267. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1076 (Okla. 1985).
268. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 39 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7562.
269. Id. at 20, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7543. The House Report
specifically provides: "Blood relationship is the very touchstone of a person's right to
share in the cultural and property benefits of an Indian tribe." Id.
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attempting to correct by enacting the ICWA.270 It is highly doubtful
Congress intended such a pivotal decision be placed with an entity it
perceived as not understanding the basics of being Indian.271
Congress' only requirement for a finding that a person is Indian is tribal
membership. This leaves the decision of who is part of their tribal
culture with the tribe. Thus, the entity most capable of determining the
significance of a person's ties to the tribe is the one making the decision.
Under this analysis of the ICWA, the cultural ties requirement could
never be used to evade tribal rights. When a tribe attempts to intervene
in an Indian child custody matter, it is obvious they consider the child
and the Indian parent part of the tribe. In fact, even if the tribe does not
attempt to intervene, the child's place in the tribe is demonstrated by the
child's membership or eligibility for membership with the tribe.272
Requiring that the parent have significant ties to the tribe ignores the
direct relationship between the Indian child and the Indian tribe. The
Court in Holyfield noted that Congress was concerned with the tribes'
rights as well as the children's and parents' rights.273 Requiring a
finding that the Indian parent participate in tribal cultural activities
would allow an individual parent to defeat application of the ICWA.
The parent could simply claim she did not participate in cultural
activities to avoid application of the ICWA. As the Court in Holyfield
states, these individual actions cannot be used to defeat application of
the ICWA.274

270. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45. See also In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973,
977-78 (Alaska 1989) (noting that "[s]tate courts must be particularly hesitant in creating
judicial exceptions to a federal act which was enacted to counter state courts' prejudicial
treatment of Indian children and communities.'').
271. See ln re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206, 209 n.2 (Or. App. 1992)
("Engrafting a new requirement into ICWA that allows the dominant society to judge
whether the parent's cultural background meets its view of what 'Indian culture' should
be puts the state courts right back into the position from which Congress has removed
them."),
272. Seeid.
If the tribe has a right to intervene, or to assert jurisdiction of its o,m court,
it may well decide that a child who meets the definition of Indian child,
although born of parents who are not in an "existing Indian cultural setting,"
should be returned to the tribe rather than being placed in a non-Indian
adoptive home. That is the tribe's, not the state court's, decision.
Id.
273. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989).
274. Id. at 51 (citing In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925,
931-33 (N.J. 1988)) (allowing the Indian parents' actions to defeat jurisdictional
provisions would be inconsistent with Congress' purpose in enacting the ICWA).
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2.

Constitutional Issues

A recent California appellate court decision adds a constitutional
dimension to the ICWA:s application to urban Indians.275 The court
in In re Bridget R. 216 held that the ICWA violates the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Tenth Amendments when it is applied to children and
families who have weak cultural ties.

a. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
The first constitutional argument the Bridget R. court made was that
application of the ICWA to families with weak cultural ties violates the
Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying the Indian
child's right to due process and equal protection of the laws.277 The
child's substantive due process rights are implicated, the court stated,
because the child is the only party with a fundamental, constitutionally
protected interest. This interest is, according to the court, the protection
of the child's relationship with the adoptive family.278 The equal
protection right is triggered, the court stated, when the ICWA treats
Indian children differently from similarly situated children on the sole
basis of the Indian child's genetic heritage. According to the court, the
child's due process and equal protection rights are not infringed upon if
the ICWA:s application is based on the Indian child's cultural heritage.279 Therefore, the court theorized, the ICWA, when applied to
families with weak cultural ties, must pass a heightened scrutiny test.
First, application must serve a compelling governmental interest, and

275. Notably, in the ICWA's eighteen-year history, no other court has held that the
ICWA's application violates any constitutionally protected interest.
276. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (1996).
277. Id. at 1502, 1507-08, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522, 526-27.
278. Id. The court stated "the twins do have a presently existing fundamental and
constitutionally protected interest in their relationship with the only family they have
ever !mown." Id. at 1507, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526. However, whether adoptive children
have a fundamental right to protect their relationship with an adoptive family is far from
a settled issue. An analysis of these interests is beyond the scope of this Comment. For
a discussion on the conflict between parent and child rights see Marian L. Faupel, The

"Baby Jessica Case" and the Claimed Conflict Between Children's and Parents' Rights,
40 WAYNE L. REV. 285 (1994).
279. Id. at 1507-08, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526-27.
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second, such application must be necessary to further that interest.280
However, this heightened scrutiny test for legislation regarding Indians
and Indian tribes is contrary to the Fifth Amendment test proscribed by
the United States Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari.28 Additionally, this test ignores the plenary power of Congress to regulate matters
involving Indians and the distinct political (as opposed to racial)
classification of Indians.
In Morton v. Mancari, non-Indian Bureau of Indian Affairs job
applicants attacked the constitutionality of the Bureau's Indian hiring
preferences. These preferences, the non-Indian applicants argued,
allowed special treatment for Indians in violation of the Fifth Amendment.282 The Court, however, held that the hiring preferences did not
violate the Fifth Amendment.283 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
focused on the special relationship between Congress and the tribes, and
Congress' plenary power to legislate regarding Indians.284 Due to this
unique relationship and plenary power, the Court held, Congress may
single out Indians for separate treatment.285 The Court noted that on
numerous occasions it had "upheld legislation that singles out Indians for
particular and special treatment."286 This treatment, the Court opined,
was not a racially based treatment, but a politically based treatment. The
Court noted that only Indians who were tribal members received the
special treatment.287 Finally, the Court concluded that the due process
test in such matters was whether the legislation was rationally related to
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to the Indians. If rational, the

280. Id.
281. 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). It should be noted that even under the court's
heightened scrutiny test, the ICWA's application to tribal members should pass
constitutional muster. See discussion infra pp. 67-71 (arguing that application meets a
heightened scrutiny test under the Tenth Amendment).
282. Id. at 539.
283. Id. at 555.
284. Id. at 551-52. The Court specifically stated:
Resolution of the instant issue turns on the unique legal status oflndian tribes
under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based on a history
of treaties and the assumption of a "guardian-ward" status, to legislate on
behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes. The plenary power of Congress
to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and
implicitly from the Constitution itself.
Id.
285. Id. at 552.
286. Id. at 554-55
287. Id. at 553 n.24. The Court specifically stated: "The preference is not directed
towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of
'federally recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially
to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial
in nature." Id.
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Court would not disturb the legislature's judgment.288 Thus, the
appropriate Fifth Amendment test to determine the constitutionality of
the ICWNs application to families with weak cultural ties is whether
such application is rationally related to Congress' unique obligation to
Indians.
At least one court has rejected constitutional due process and equal
protection attacks where the ICWA has been applied to Indians who
lived in urban areas isolated from tribal culture. In In re Armell, 289 an
Illinois appeal court relied on Congress' plenary power and Morton v.
Mancari to hold that the ICWA did not violate an Indian child's due
process and equal protection rights. First, the court concluded that the
ICWNs application had not infringed upon the Indian child's equal
protection rights. The ICWA, the court stated, did not classify Indians
as a racial group, but as a political group outside the scope of an equal
protection attack. Supporting the conclusion, the court reasoned, was
Congress' plenary power to regulate Indians either on or off the
reservation.290 The court held that Congress' judgment regarding such
regulation would not be disturbed if it was rationally tied to the
execution of Congress' unique obligation to the Indians.291 The court
concluded that this test was met as the ICWA, in application, was
essential to protect tribal culture and to assure the existence of Indian
tribes.292
The court also concluded that the ICWNs application to urban Indians
did not infringe upon the child's due process rights. The court held that
the child's lack of contact with the tribe had no bearing on a due process

288. Id. at 555. The Court specifically stated: "As long as the special treatment
can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed." Id.
289. 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct 1990). Armel[ involved a three and one-half
year-old Indian child who was found rummaging through a garbage can in metropolitan
Chicago. Social services was granted temporary custody of the Indian child who was
then placed with a foster family. Following notice, the child's tribe petitioned to transfer
jurisdiction to its tribal court. At the time of notice to the child's tribe, the child was
not an enrolled tribal member, but was eligible for enrollment Following the tribe's
petition to transfer jurisdiction to tribal court, they enrolled the child as a tribal member.
The Indian child's attorney objected to transfer to tribal court Id. at 1062-63.
290. Id. at 1067-68.
291. Id. at 1068.
292. Id. at 1067-68. The court specifically stated: "The provisions of the ICWA
were deemed by Congress to be essential for the protection of Indian culture and to
assure the very existence oflndian tribes." Id. at 1068.
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claim. The court opined that the ICWA was designed to protect tribal
members domiciled both on and off the reservation.293 Holyfield, the
court reasoned, supported this conclusion as the Supreme Court upheld
tribal jurisdiction even though the parents did not want tribal involvement and the child had never had contact with the tribe.294
This rationale equally applies to matters involving the children of
urban Indians who may not have strong cultural ties. By recognizing a
bond between an Indian child and his tribe, the ICWA seeks to protect
tribal culture and to assure the existence of Indian tribes. The tribe in
this situation has an even stronger interest in maintaining a relationship
with the Indian child. Presumably, the Indian child, through no fault of
his own, has been denied exposure to his cultural heritage. By
recognizing an interest between this Indian child and his tribe, the ICWA
affords the tribe an opportunity to rectify the situation. Recognition of
the tribal interest is of particular importance when considered in light of
past assimilationist policies which may have resulted in the Indian
parents' lack of cultural ties.295 By denying application of the ICWA
to urban Indians who may lack strong cultural ties, a court fserpetuates
assimilationist policies designed to extinguish tribal culture. 96
Additionally, Congress, in enacting the ICWA, recognized the
importance of the bond between the Indian child and his tribe. In fact,
this bond was so important that it warranted application of the ICWA to
children who were not current tribal members, but only eligible for

293. Id. The court specifically stated: "The ICWA constitutes a scheme enacted
by Congress to ensure that Indian tribal members are protected, regardless of the lack
of present tribal contacts." Id.
294. Id. (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48
(1989)).
295. The Bureau of Indian Affair's Voluntary Relocation Program illustrates the
push for dispersion of Indians from their reservation homes to urban America. The
program, implemented in 1931, attempted to integrate Indians into urban America by
providing them with permanent off-reservation jobs. Participants received a one-way
ticket to the city and financial assistance until they received their first pay check. The
program received its biggest push following World War II. In fiscal year 1953, 2,600
Indians were permanently placed in off-reservation jobs and thousands more were placed
in temporary off-reservation positions. Two years later, placements had increased by
sixty percent COHEN, supra note 175, at 234.
296. See In re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. App. 1992). In addressing the
fallacy of state courts determining cultural ties the court stated:
[Allowing state courts to determine what constitutes Indian culture] would be
especially ironic, in that one of the reasons that the parents may not be
involved in their Indian culture could be the very policies ofremoval oflndian
children that ICWA was intended to counteract • . . • If state courts impose
their own value system on these decisions, the tribes will never be able to
regain members who have been lost because of earlier government policies.
Id. at 209 n.2.
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membership.297 The House report accompanying the ICWA reports
that applying the ICWA to these children was required for their
protection.298 An Indian child's cultural heritage is not a detriment,
but a benefit which must be protected.
In conclusion, the Bridget R. court argues that where the Indian child's
parents lack significant social, cultural, or political ties to the Indian
community, the ICWNs purpose of protecting tribal culture and assuring
the existence of Indian tribes can never be met. However, by denying
application of the ICWA, the Indian child will have no chance of
exposure to his tribal heritage. That some tribal members may have lost
their cultural ties is a sad fact of the success of past assimilationist
policies. Limiting the tribes' ability to reach children of these tribal
members assures that the children will never have the benefit of their
cultural heritage and seals the success of assimilationist policies.
b.

Tenth Amendment

The second constitutional argument the Bridget R. court makes is that
the ICWA violates the Constitution's Tenth Amendment by infringing
on rights ordinarily reserved to the states when it is applied to families
with weak cultural ties.299 The court argues that because matters
involving family relationships are generally reserved to the states, the
ICWA should only apply if, in application, it passes at least one of two
constitutional tests. The first test is that the ICWNs application must
serve the specific purpose for which it was enacted, namely, "to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families."300 The second
test is that application must serve the general purpose of protecting tribal
self-govemment.301 The Bridget R. court concludes that the ICWA's
application to families with weak cultural ties fails both tests and

297. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7539. The report specifically provides: ''This minor, perhaps infant, Indian does not
have the capacity to initiate the formal, mechanical procedure necessary to become
enrolled in his tribe to !alee advantage of the very valuable cultural and property benefits
flowing therefrom." Id.
298. Id. The report specifically provides: "Obviously, Congress has power to act
for [the Indian children's] protection." Id.
·
299. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1510, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 528
(1996), cert denied, Cindy R. v. James R., 117 S. Ct 693 (1997).
300. Id. at 1511, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902).
301. Id.
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therefore violates the Tenth Amendment. However, the court's
conclusion and arguments fail for two reasons. First, the court has
applied the wrong test to determine whether the ICWA:s application
violates the Tenth Amendment. Second, the ICWNs application to
families with weak cultural ties meets the court's test, as it serves both
the specific purpose for which the ICWA was enacted and the general
purpose of protecting tribal self-government.
The House Report accompanying the ICWA supports Tenth Amendment constitutionality when the ICWA is applied to urban Indians with
weak cultural ties. Interestingly, during the drafting of the ICWA, the
Department of Justice expressed concern regarding the constitutionality
of certain ICWA provisions.302 Congress rejected this concern by
relying on its plenary power over Indians. First, Congress recognized
its plenary power to legislate regarding Indians. This power is not
limited to tribes but extends to the individual members of the tribe.303
Second, Congress noted that this power is not limited by the geographical boundaries of a tribes' reservation. The plenary power over Indians
extends to activities occurring on or off the reservation. 304 Additionally, Congress noted that it has wide discretion in matters involving
Indians and that courts should honor this discretion unless Congress'
actions are purely arbitrary.305 Finally, Congress noted that its "'power
. . . to regulate or prohibit traffic with tribal Indians within a State
whether upon or off an Indian reservation is well settled . . .. "'306
Thus, the appropriate test to determine constitutionality under the Tenth
Amendment is whether Congress' exercise of power over families who
may have weak cultural ties is arbitrary. When considered in light of
302. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7534.
303. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7536. The report provides that
"commerce with Indians [sic] tribes means commerce with the individuals composing
those tribes." Id. (quoting U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 417 (1866)).
304. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7537. The report provides:
If commerce, or traffic, or intercourse is carried on with an Indian tribe, or
with a member of such tribe, it is subject to be regulated by Congress;
although within the limits of a State. The locality of the traffic can have
nothing to do with the power. The right to exercise it in reference to any
Indian tribe, or any person who is a member of such tribe, is absolute, without
reference to the locality of the traffic, or the locality of the tribe, or the
member of the tribe with whom it is carried on.
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 418 (1866)).
305. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7538. The report provides that "'it
must also be conceded that, in determining what is reasonably essential to the protection
of the Indians Congress is invested with a wide discretion and its action, unless purely
arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect by the courts."' Id. (quoting Perrin v.
U.S., 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914)).
306. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597 (1961) (emphasis added)),
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the ICWA's history, such exercise of power is not arbitrary. In fact,
applying the ICWA to families who may have weak cultural ties even
meets the heightened Bridget R. test of serving the specific congressional
purpose of protecting tribal integrity or the general congressional purpose
of protecting tribal self-government.
The ICWNs history shows that when Congress enacted the ICWA,
tribal leaders feared that tribal culture and the very existence of the
tribes was in jeopardy.307 Past assimilation policies had removed tribal
members from the reservations and had dispersed them throughout the
United States, generally in urban areas.308 The high rate of adoption
and foster care placement of Indian children had the same effect.309
An unwanted geographical boundary had been forced between the tribe
and its members. By enacting the ICWA, Congress was attempting,
among other things, to reverse the effect of past assimilation policies.
To be effective, the ICWA would have to protect tribal rights regarding
child custody matters arising off the reservation. To this end, congressional exercise of power is not arbitrary. Additionally, it furthers the
ICWA's specific purpose of promoting the integrity of Indian tribes, and
it protects the Indian tribes' right to self-government of its tribal
members.
Illustrative of the ICWA's constitutionality is a South Dakota Supreme
Court case which upholds the ICWA in the face of a Tenth Amendment
attack. In In re Guardianship of D.L.L. & C.L.L. 310 the South Dakota
court held that the ICWA did not violate the Tenth Amendment.311
The court reasoned that Congress had plenary power over Indians as
granted by the Indian Commerce Clause.312 Congress therefore could

307. Hearings on S. 1214 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public
Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 193 (1978)
(statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians);
see supra note I.
308. See supra note 295.
309. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text
310. 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D. 1980).
3 I I. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
312. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. Section 8 provides in pertinent part: "The
Congress shall have power [t]o ... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
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legislate regarding Indians as long as the legislation was not arbitrary.313 Additionally, the court held that the tribal member's physical
location did not change the Tenth Amendment analysis. The analysis
instead hinged on whether there was a need for tribal self-government
over the matter.314 The court concluded that this need was met
because the greatest threat to tribal self-governance was interference in
custody matters of tribal members.315 Denying the ICWA's application
to tribal members who may have weak cultural ties is no less a threat to
tribal self-governance over custody matters involving tribal members.
As such, it does not violate the Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
V.

CONCLUSION

The existing Indian family exception is a judicially created exception
to the ICWA. The ICWA applies to child custody matters regarding
Indian children. An Indian child is a member or a potential member of
an Indian tribe. The only exceptions to child custody matters are
divorce proceedings and juvenile delinquency matters. Under the
exception, courts have created a third requirement for invoking the
ICWA. Namely, the child custody matter must involve the removal of
the child from an existing Indian family. Additionally, this Indian parent
must have significant ties to tribal culture or the reservation.
The basic premise of the existing Indian family exception is flawed.
The rationale for the exception is that Congress did not intend the ICWA
apply in Indian child custody matters unless the matter involved the
removal of an Indian child from an existing Indian family. The rationale
skews Congress' intent by focusing on isolated portions of the legislative
history, congressional findings, congressional policy, and the ICWA
procedural provisions. However, when viewed as a whole, these sources
show that Congress' intent in enacting the ICWA was to protect the
313. In re Guardianship of D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d at 281. The court specifically
stated:
The Tenth Amendment, which reserves all nondelegated powers to the states
or the people, has not been violated by the [!CWA]. The plenary power of
Congress to legislate with respect to Indians is a deep-seated one. Such
legislation does not infringe upon the Tenth Amendment as long as the
legislative power is not exercised arbitrarily.
Id.
3 I4. Id. at 28 I. The court specifically stated: "The locus of the act of a member
is not conclusive. Rather, the test is a broader one, hinging on whether the matter
demands exercise of the tribe's responsibility of self-government." Id.
315. Id. The court specifically stated: "There can be no greater threat to essential
tribal relations and to the tribal power of self-government than to interfere in questions
of custody of tribal members." Id.
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child, the extended family, and the tribe. Limiting the ICWA:s
application under the exception subverts Congress' intent to protect the
child, the extended family, and the tribe.
The existing Indian family exception is also contrary to the United
States Supreme Court's analysis of the ICWA in HolY.field. Tribal
interests, instead of being placed on an even footing with parental rights,
are ignored under the exception. Individual actions effectively defeat the
tribe's right, not only to jurisdiction, but even to participation in the
child custody matter. The exception places a pivotal issue in the hands
of the state courts. These courts are the least qualified of all participants
to determine the tribe's place in the Indian child's life. The state courts
must follow the plain language of the ICWA and apply the ICWA to all
child custody matters involving Indian children as defined by the ICWA.
Until state courts abandon the use of the exception, it will be a
continuing threat to tribal interests and the survival of Indian culture.
WENDY THERESE PARNELL
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